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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I

Diaz J oalled maker of modern Mexico came from the mountain state of
I

Oaxaoa.

He studied law under Juarez, became one of the most prominent

oitizens of his state and later fought with Ju~rez for the liberation of
Mexico from the French Empire.

Ju~rez became President of Mexico and in

1872 was the first of Mexico's presidents to die in office.

Lerdo de Tejado,

justice of the Supreme Court legally suoceeded to the Presidenoy.

~

Diaz

plotted against him and on November 23, 1876, entered the capital in triumph.
I

Diaz was a strong ruler.

His

te~

is rememberedJ however, as the era

when foreign eoonomy penetrated Mexioo~ During his dictatorship, foreign
oapital oame to Mexioo, and as labor remained oheap Mexico·s natural
resouroes were exploited.

Generous conoessions were given foreigners and

they left their influenoe on railroads, mines, oil fields, and farmland -developing Mexico, but making use of her at the same time.

Concessions and

the manner in which they were operated aroused peoplets hostility over all
I

the land, but Diaz was able to keep them in subjection. 2 Workingmen were
killed if they attempted to strike, and Indians were sold into slavery.

-_.. _------1

...

_---

Ernest Gruening, Mexioo

~~

Heritage, Century Co., N.Y., 1928, 559.

2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History Of The United States, Henry Holt
&: Co., N.Y., 1942, 540.
-1
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Anyone who protested was either imprisoned or killed.
oal ohiefs robbed the Indians of their land.

Governors and politi-

Carlo De Fornaro in his work

entitled Carranza and Mexioo states that by 1892 the ownership of all large
bodies of agricultural land had passed fran the possession of more than a
million small farmers into less than fifty rich families and corporations of
I

the Diaz clique.

The Indians lost their valuable land and independent

economio life and went into peonage on the great haoiendas, in the mines and
faotories where they could be more easily controlled by soldiers. 3
Flagg Bemis in his book entitled A Diplomatio History

~

Samuel

The United States

I

further concludes that during Diaz' reign there was no progress in eduoation,
public welfare, sanitation or social improvement. 4
H. I.

Priestl~

in his book,

~

But on the other hand,

Mexioan Nation, A History had this to say in

summary:

I

Under D1az Mexico beoame the safest country
in the world, without exoeption. It was policed
by some three thousand rurales, a small number of
Municipal gendarnes, and an armw of insignificant
proportions in reserve. This peaoe was •••
spontaneous and natural, after the f1rst years of
the dictatorship.5
Madero advooated oonstitutional liberties.
Presidential

3

Succession~~,

Carlo De Fornaro, Carranza

~

In his book entitled

he criticized the president and

urgedpeo~le

Mexico, Mitchel Kenner1ey, N.Y., 1915, 45.

4 Bemis, 541.
5 Herbert Ingram Priestley, The Mexican Nation, A History, Maomillan Co.,
1960, 393.

-

--
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to insist on the right to a tair ballot and the right to ohoose a oandidate
of their own.

The demoorats were arrested, and while they were in prison, an
I

eleotion was held and Diaz was again triumphant.
I

safely installed again, Diaz released Madero.

Believing that he was

But Madero would not be supI

pressed, he issued his "Plan of San Luis Potosi" in whioh he advooated free
suffrage, no re-eleotion, restoration of land to the Indians, and freedom for
political prisoners.
resigned.

His efforts were effective.

I

On May 24, 1910, Diaz

I

At the last, Diaz tried to put through reforms but he was too late

Civil war had begun May 6, 1911.

The city of Ju~rez was the soene of the
I

I

most deoisive battle of the oonfliot, and, as Juarez was oaptured, Diaz
sailed from Mexico forever.

He is written about as a great and powerful

ruler, but he forgot the people trom whom his power came. 6
On June 7, 1911, Madero triumphantly marohed into Mexico City.
government is referred to as anti-capitalistio and anti-foreign.

His

He was an

idealist, believing that the people owned the land but having no practioal
method ot oarrying out his ideas.
from all quarters.

Soon opposition and disoontentment arose

The upper classes of the old r'gime were against any

improvement of the lot ot the common people.

And the oommon people were

disgruntled beoause they did not reoeive the land at onoe.

Revolts ocourred.

Before 1913, tour attempts had been made to overthrow the government.

On

February 18, 1913, Generals Blanquet and Huerta entered the National Palaoe,
which they were supposed to defend, and arrested Madero.

-_.._----------6

~.,

297

.!i.!.!9..

The men in power,
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,

Felix Diaz (nephew ot the tormer president, Portirio Diaz), Blanquet, and
Huerta oalled oongress into extraordinary session and made Huerta Provisional
President.

This ooup d"tat was aooomplished with the aid ot the armywhioh
I

/

•

was accustomed to obeying Huerta, a general during Diaz' regl.m8.

On

February 23, 1913, Madero and vice-President Su~rez were shot. 7
The Amerioan Ambassador to Mexioo, Henry Lane Wilson, advooated the
recognition ot Huerta.

Kiss Inez Thomas in her thesis entitled Wilson and

Huerta commented that the American Ambassador advocated "dollar Diplomacy."

He had been appointed by tormer President Taft who praotioed the same theory.
The writer oontinues, "Henry Lane Wilson's brother, tormer Senator John
Wilson, was intimate with Ballinger, who was a olose triend of the
Guggenheims.

The Guggenheims had oommeroial interest in Kexioo.

The Ambas-

sador was known to be a spokesman for the oommeroial interests in Mexioo.
He oontinually urged the reoognition of the Huerta government •••• He telt
that an orderly government would better proteot United States interests and
investments. ,,8 But this would seem to assume ths.t Huerta would bring order
and tranquillity.

However, the Ambassador's plans were oompletely dis-

arranged when on Maroh 4, 1913. the Tatt aaninistration retired and Woodrow
Wilson beoame President of the United States.

In his reports, the ambassador

who was anxious to have Huerta reoognized, seemed to overestimate Huerta's
power and minimize the nature and extent of the revolt against him whioh was

-----_ _------..
...

7 J. Fred Rippy, Jose Vasoonoelos, Guy Stevens, Mexico, The University ot
Chioago Press, Chioago, 1928, 36.
8

Inez Thomas, Wilson And Huerta, unpublished thesis, Loyola University,
Chicago, 1946, 36-37.

p
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rampant in many ot the seotions ot Mexioo.

The Amerioan oonsuls in the war-

ring seotions presented a ditterent picture as shown in their reports to
washington ot the various seotional revolts. 9 The leading state in revolt
against Huerta was Coahuila whioh was governed by Carranza who issued a
formal Proolamation of Independence on February 19, 19l5:
Proclamation ot the Independence
ot the State ot Coahuila
Venustiano Carranza, Constitutional
Governor ot the tree and sovereign state ot
Coahuila de Zaragoza, to the inhabitants
thereot, greeting.
Know ye that the Congrel. ot this State
ba. deoreed as tollows&
The XXII Constitutional Congress ot the
tree, independent and lovereign State ot
Coahuila de Zaragosa decreest
Humber 1421.
Article 1. General Victoriano Huerta
is not reoognized in his oharaoter ot
Chiet ot the Exeoutive Power ot the Republio, whioh he alleges to have been oonterred upon him by the Senate; and none
ot his aots and orders in that oapaoity
are reoognized.
Artiole 2. Extraordinary powers are
granted to the Exeoutive ot the State
in all the branohes of the Publio AdIIlinistration in order that he may suppress
a~ that he may see fit to suppress and
in order that he may pr coeed to arm
toroes to aid in the support of Constitutional order in the Republio ••• lO

---~----------9 Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States,Government
PrIntIng OHioe ,-WaS1irngton, 1918, 136-~1r. -reFealEer referred to as
For. Rela. To give the reader an example ot what is to be found in this
oltatIon, a few ot the telegrams trom the Amerioan oonsul. are quoted on
the three pages direotly following. These are oited by tootnotes 11 to 15
inclusive.

-

10 Ibid., 721.

..
6

A telegram trom the American Consul General at Monterey to the Secretary ot
state ot the United States reads as tollows,
American Consulate General
Monterey. February 24, 1913
The situation in northern Mexioo looks less
enoouraging. Active rebel armies in the ,
States ot Coahuila, Sonora, San Luis Potosi. ll
Hanna

The PrO'Yisional Governor ot Sonora sent the tollolling telegram to President
Wilson:
San Antonio, Texas,
February 28, 1913
The President. I take the liberty as
a _.ber ot tbs National Congress ot
)lexioo to enter proteat against the
reoognition ot the spurious government
nowattanpting to be established 'b1
Huerta. President Madero never resigned
and the alleged resignation presented to
Congress was a torgery ••• 12
R. V. Peaqueira
.Ambassador Wilson, however, oontinued to work untiringly tor the reoognition
of Huerta; as is evident from. this telegrams
The Amerioan Ambassador to the
Seoreta~

ot State

Amerioan !mba • ..,
Mexico. Maroh 12, 1913

•••

.. _------- .... _--

11
12

-Ibid.,
Ibid •• 749.
736.

General Huerta is pre_inently a
soldier, a man ot iron••• who knOWlJ.
what he wants and how to get it, and
is not. I believe overly partioular
as to his methods. He is a tirm beliver in tl}e polioy ot General
Portirio Dlaz and believes in the

II
I.
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cultivation of the oloaeat and moat
friendly relations with the United States
I believe ht. to be a sinoere patriot.13
I

flro day8 later, our American Consul at Cuidad Porfirio Dial, telegraphed the
State Department as folloDt
Amerioan Con8ulate,
Eagle Pasl, Maroh 14, 1913
~

believe Governor Carranza's goal
is the Presidency. His suooess iJl
seouriJlg volUJlteers is _questionable J
about 2,000 at Monolova.14
Luther T. Ellsworth
On Maroh 30, 1913, Carranla deolared himself proviaional p-esident of .xioo

and on July 11th, Neleon O'Shaughnessy replaoed Henry Lane Wilson as . .balsador. l5
Upon taking office, President Wilson was faoed with the question of
reoognition of General Huerta mo had beoame provisional president thirteen
daY'8 earlier.

Tatt'. administration had followed a polioY' of non-interterence

IliS8 ThQlDas write. that ainoe Madero _s ahot while in the custody of General
Huerta, President Tart deolined to take al\Y immediate aotion 1Ihich might
prove embarrassing to the inooming president.

At the same time, Taft

believed Huerta would be reoognized eventuall1. 16

Wileon, 1n his Maroh 11.

1913, statement outlined his friendly attitude towards Latin .Amerioa.

He

deolared his adminiatratlonwas for responsible governments in Latin Amerioa •

......-----.. __ .....

-

IS Ibid.. 775.
14
15
16

Ibid., 777.

-

Ibid •• 784-812.

Thomas, 26.

S

He said. "We hold that just gOTerDlllent rests upon the consent of the
governed ••• "11

This seeaed to indicate that he was not going to reoognize

the bea...,. handed depotism of Huerta, and that he desired to he Ip Mexico
towards an era of democracy.

In the same address, he implied that the United

states lIOuld not seek territory in lAtin .America.

He also spoke of hie

cern for the trade relations between the two oontinentsl

0021-

"The United States

has nothing to aeek in Central and South Amerioa exoept the lasting interests
of the people a of the two continents, the aeourity of gOTerDlllents intended to
the people and for no speoial group or interest, and the development of
personal and trade relationships between the two continents Whioh shall
redound to the profits and advantages of both and interfere with the rights
and liberties ot neither."lS
Wilson's first plan was to unite the people of the two continents for
praotical reasona.

This Pan-American idea was not n.....

It goes baok to

John Quinoy Adams. BeDZ7 Clay. James Monroe, and James G. Blaine had carried
it on.

The president. in his Maroh 11, 1913, speeoh tried to lessen the

Latin Amer ican s . pioionl whioh had been growing since the Unl ted Statel had
annexed Texas.

Theodore RooseTelt's "big stiok" policy and the Panama

revolution, as well as the "dollar diplomacy" of Knox and Tart had made Latin

-_.._----------11

Edgar E. Robinson &: Victor J. West, The Foreign POliOZ of Woodrow Wilson.
1913-1911, Macmlllan Co •• B.T., 191i;"T19 et seq.
-

..

18

-----

"President Wl1aon And Latin America," The American Journal of Iuterational ~, Baker, Voorhh &: Co., N.t:";"'l§lS. Voi. 7, 332.-
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Amerioan teeling run high.

The beliet, which Woodrow Wilson also shared,

that Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and speoial American interest played a
re.ponsible role in the revolt against Madero e.peoially antagonized some
Mexican•• 19 Prie.tley oomment. on the ambassador's attitude toward Madero
thus I
Henry Lane Wil.oll was in1m1oal to
.dero throughout the Tragio Ten Day.
(the ten day. betore .dero was made
prisoner by Huerta). The Imbas..,
(American) • • the oenter o~lanti-gOTern
ment aotivity. Huerta and Dlas visited
him there OIl the night of February 18.
and talked with him ooncerning their
paot for the division ot the governmental
powers they had sehed. There the D8mel
ot the prospeotive mini.ters were discussed and agreed upon. Wilson then submitted them to the toreign ministers,
who were waitiug in an adjoining room.
and asked their oomment s, in case an.y ot
the appointments .eemed inappropriate.
The .inisters merely took note ot the"
but made no c <IIIIIlent. • • • Huerta and Diaa
shortly thereatter ]a tt, singly. The
memberl or the Corps, on taking their
farewelll, expressed 80licitude tor the
li.... s ot the imprisoned executives.
Mr. Wil.oll .eemed not deeply moved. Hi.
a.sooiat •• noted that he had felt tree to
lend hi. influence to the destruction ot
a legitimate govermnent and to listen to
plans tor the organbation ot the usurping
taction, but when it came to proposals to
eav. the liTes ot the prisoners, he had no
plans, nor even suggestions to otter.20

-....-~----.-.---

19 Harley Botter, The Orj!in. ot the Foreili Policy of Woodrow Wilson, The
Johns Hopkins Press,
ItlDiore-;-I'931, 2 .
20

Priestley, 415.

11
reoognized Huerta.

John Lina. Governor of Minnesota. was sent to Mexioo as a

_peoial agent of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's intention ._ to give aotive
assistance to Mexioo to help it out of its difficulties.

So instead of keep-

ing to his "hands off" polioy as expressed in his Maroh 11, 1913 speeoh, and
to the ~tme honored policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
foreign nations he proposed the following terms through Lind,
1)
2)
3)
4)

The immediate oessation of fighting
throughout Mexico •••
Seourity for an early and tree election •••
Consent of General Huerta not to be a
candidate in the forthooming eleotion •••
The agreement of all parties to abide
by the result ot the eleotion•••

Huerta rejeoted the proposals. His Seoretary ot Foreign Affairs, F. Gamboa,
sent fOrmAl notice ot rejeotion; "Mexioo oan not for one moment take into
consideration the four

'0

onditi ons which His Excellency Mr. Wilson has been

pleased to propose through your honorable and worthy channel ••• "23 Because
Huerta flatly rejeoted the oondi tions presented by Lind, the president
deoided to bring pUblio pressure upon Huerta in his aessage ot August 27,
1913, to Congress. Wilson wanted to tell the nation ot his proposals and the
principle of his policy toward Mexioo. He spoke ot the obligations ot the
United state. government to protect American interests but he put forth first
the "obligation to Mexico herself." American friendship should be such as to
lead to willing saorifices in Mexicots time of trouble.
meant the curtailment of American interest in Mexioo.

By sacrifices, he
The United States

should be interested in the "peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico."
Thi. was to be accomplished by "an enlargement of the field of selt-govern-

-----

------_ .......

23 The Am. Jour. Intnat'l.14w, 1913, Vol. 1 supp., 219-292.
CoT;"insor;"&-Ylest 15.. -

See al.o

12
ment and the reali&.tion of the hopes and rights of a nation with whose best
aspirations,

10

long suppressed and disappointed, we deeply s,ympathize."

Huerta was not able to restore order so President Wilson belieTed it the dut.y
of the United States government to volunteer to assist to bring about peace
and "set up a universally acknowledged political authority"
was his reason for sending Lind to Mexico.
Wilson's future policy.

in Mexico.

This

This address also announced

It contained the spirit of Wilson's diplomacy

throughout his tem, "Meanwhile, what 18 it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patienoe and done with calm and dillinterested deliberation....

we

oan afford to exercise the selt-restraint of

a really great nation Which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it
It was our duty to offer our active assistance.

It i8 now our dut,y to ahow

what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Jlexico to set their
atfairs in order again and wait for a
friendly counsels •••• n24

furthe~

opportunity to ofter our

After Huerta rejeoted the President's proposals, Wilsonts stand beoame
more aggressive.

OtShaughnes~

sent a message to Wilson dated October 13,

1913, .tating that Buerta dissolved the Congress, assumed the powers granted
the oongress in the Departments ot Govermnent, Finanoe, and War.
October
ma~

2~rd

Jnd on

another message was reoeived from 0' Shaughnessy stating that

deputies had been arrested on the dissolution ot the Chamber. American

....... - ...

_-------

24 con,ressional Record, 63 Cong •• 1 sess., 1913, Vol. 50, 3803, (B. Doc.
20!. For oomments on the president's speeoh see Robinson & West, 16-18.

13

relations with Mexico were now in a deadlock.

On October 26, 1913, Huerta

was eleoted President ot I8xioo. 25
The next step in Wilson t a Latin American policy _s announced at Mobile
Alabama, October 27th, 1913, one day atter Huerta'. eleotion.
meaning of his foreign polioy now became absolutely clear.

The tull

He pointed out th

danger involTed in the ooncessions obtained by toreign investors in Latin
America. He predicted ~hat eTentually these conoessions would be replaoed by
iuvestments.

The president saw the difference between his ideal and the

aotions of his oountry in the paat. He stated that "the United State. will
neTer again seek one additional foot ot territory by conquest. 1t He advocated
const!tutional liberty, "Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity aa
against material interests -- that ••• is the issue.,,2S
Robinson adequately summarized Wilsonts foreign polioy by stating that
it was tir.aly established betore the expiration ot 1913. Fair dealing involTed a retusal to tolerate the "extension ot the finanoial interest of the
United States at the expense of peoples less advanoed industrially, hi.ndlT
oo-operation embodied in a moral support ot the torces ot law and

ord~r

and a

reliance upon the universal principle of l.lf-goTernment.... At all times

-- ...._-..... _----.

--

26 For. Rels., 1913, 838-850.

26

James Brown Soott, ed., President Wilson's Foreign POli~, Oxford
Universlt.1 Pres., N.Y., 1918, 19-26. These pages glT.
11 text ot the
president speeoh. For cClIIIIIIlents see Robinson &: West. 21 J alao, Notter,
266-72.

t.
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emphases had been placed upon the spirit ot the United states rather than
upon their might aa a Dation •• 27

Botter, in a like Tain, aaid that the

questions Wilson dealt with were not mere matters ot diplomacy ••• but were
"shot through with the principles ot life.
our ~ide.

Morality, not expedience" must be

By the end ot 1913, the preaident maintained an attitude ot

"watchful waiting."

Constitutional gOTernment must be eatablished in Mexico

to obtain peaoe in America. 26

In his annual aessage to Congress, December 2,

1913, Wil.on surveyed his foreign policy.

He continued advooating peace.

He

declared that the United States was the ohampion ot "constitutional goverDlDeni
in AmericaJ we are more than friends, we are its championsJ Decause in no
other ,...y can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every ,...y to make proot
ot our friendship, work out their own developaent in peace and liberty •••• 1t
If' Huerta prevented a real government frClll being inaugurated and "has made it
doubtful whether even the most elementary and rundamental right. either of her
own people or of the oitizens ot other countries resident .tthin her territor~
oan long be aucoeaatull,. sateguarded, and which threatens. it long continued,
to imperil the interest ot peaoe, order, and 'tolerable lite in the land.
immediatel,. to the aouth ot us....

By a little every day his power and

prestige are orumbling and the collapae is not tar a....y.

We shall not, I

believe. be obligated to a:a.ter our pOlicf ot watchful waiting. 29
--..._--------27 Robinson & West,28.
28

Notter, 272.

29

Cong.

!!!.,

See also Robinson & West, 23.
63 Cong., 2 8eS8., 1913, Vol. 51, 43.

jIP
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Wilson t IS Den important step .... to raise the arms embargo against
)lexioo.

Lind reoommended that Carraua be supported.

in policy trca passive waiting to poai tive aotion.

Thh marked a change

PreTiously, the president

had been neutral toward the different factions except Huertistos, warring for
the Jlexican gOTerIDllent.
Huerta.

He adTocated a fair election of

SCIRe

one other than

Despite the arms embargo ot the United States Huerta reoeived arms

frOll toreign govermaEll'lta who reccgnized him, but, of course, the other

factions could not.

Reither could they receive arms fraa the United States

which by lifting the embargo wculd seem. to endorse the rebel leader. Carranza.
However. Wilson believed that the basis for the revolution was the land
question and that the oonstitutionalists were going to provide adequate capeneation in this case.

By allowing the forcea of Carraua to reoeive

.Amerioan arms, it was hoped that the resulting oivil ....r would reaoh-e the
issue in a more satisfactory Jl8.nner than to have a toreign po.... r interfere
which would make the problem more difficult. SO Wilson uneasily lifted the
anus . .bargo February 3, 191.:
A PROCLAIIATIOB

Whereas, by a Proolamation ot the
President issued on Vareh 14, 1912 •••
it was declared that there existed in
Mexioo oonditions of dcaestio violence
whioh ..ere promoted by the use of arms
or munitions of .....r procured £rca
the United State •••• it thereupon became unlawfal to export arms or munitions

-----,.-------....
so )lotter, 283.

,.
16

ot war to Mexico... Now. theretore. I.
Woodrow Wilson •••• hereby deolare and
proclaim that. as the oonditions on
whioh the Proclamation ot March 14. 1912,
_s based bave essentially o hanged •
aDd as it 11 desirable to plaoe the
United state. with reterence to the
exportation or arma or munitions ot
war to Mexioo in the ......e position as
other Powers. the Rid Proclamation is
hereby revoked ••• l1
Commenting on the President' 8 Proolamati on ot February 3. 1914. an editorial
in the Amerioan Journal ot Internati ona1 Law .tated it the preeideut had
T

_~

__

reoognized Huerta. Carranza would have been regarded
against the legitimate government ot Mexico.
there existed no 18 gal government.

eL'

a rebel in anns

If no party was reoognized.

As matters .tood the law ot )(arch 14,

1912. worked against the oonstitutionaliat.and in tavor ot Huerta wbo

118..

able to obtain munitions tram toreign nations .inoe he was recognized by most

ot them.

Consequently, Wilson wi thdrew the embargo on the importation ot

arms and thus plaoed the 1I8.rring group. upon an equal ba.i •• 32
The United States was hoping that Mexioo, it lett tree to settle her
attair. a. Boon as possible would be able to put them on a oonstitutional
basis by her own torce.
better equipnent.

But the oonstitutionalist. made little u.e ot their

They _de no important military gains.

Wilson' 8 hopes tor

settlement in the immediate future were not realized. 13

-----~--.---",.-31
32

--

For. Rels., 1914, ....8.
"Mediation In Kexioo." .Amerioan Journal ot International Law, 1914, Vol. 8
680.
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33 Robinson & West, 26.
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On April 9, 1914, Adairal Mayo of the United States Navy sent the

following telegram to General Zaragoza: M
u.S.S. DOlihin
Tampioo, April 9,914
This morning an officer ••• of the Mexican
military forees arrestea and marohed through
the .~reet of Tampico a oommissioned otfioer
ot the United State. Na'7, the Paymaster ot
the U.S.8. Dolphin. together with .even men
composing tKe or.... or the ... Dol!h1n.
At the tiae of this arres~ t:e otticer and
.en ooncerned were unarmed and engaged in
loading Oa8e8 ot ga80line whioh had been
purchased on Sbore •••• 35
Mayo
The men were released and Admiral Mayo was tendered an apology and an
expre8sion ot regret fra Huerta.
salute of twenty-one

gulls

But Jlayo d8ll&ll.ded a fOrmAl apology. the

to be giTeXl the United State. rlag.

Huerta refused.

Pres1dent W1110D ordered the North Amerioan fleet to the east oO&st of Mexico
and on April 15th, the Pacific tleet to the west coast.

The ports of Tampioo

and Vera Cruz on the east ooast and ports on the west 00a8t were sebed 80 as

to blookade Mexico. 36

On April 20. 191-1. Wilson 1I8J1t betore Congress

an acoount of the Tampioo affair.

to give

In t his message the President stated that

this act was made to entoroe respect tor the United States.
Tampioo affair was not an isolated inoident.

He said that the

A series ot incidents had

ocourred whioh showed that Huerta had little regard for the dignity ot the

-------....----34

Coaanding the Huertieta toroes resisting the Constitutionalists at
Tampioo.

35

~.!!!!

••

1914, 448..!.! seq.

36 Robinson & West, 32.

18
United States government.

War was not his a1m but he asked approval of Con-

gresl to use the armed forces of the United State. to obtain from Huerta and
his adherent. full reccgnition of the right. and dignity of the United States
ttl, therefore,

Ct1ll8

to ask your apprO'9'&l that I Ihould use the armed forces

ot the United States in suoh ways and to such an extent as may be necessary t
obtain from Geural Huerta and his adherents the tullest recognition ot the
rights and dignity ot the United States, even amidst the distressing condition ••• in Mexioo. ttS1

As has been indicated otten, Wilson's demands were

made to the president ot Mexioo lIhom he did not recognbe al existing.
On the 21st ot April, the custea house at Vera Cruz was taken by

Amerioan mariuI, and on the 22nd, the port ot Vera Crus was ocoupied.

The

blooade of the Mexican coast and seizure of the ports of Tampico and Vera
Cruz cut ctt the munitions Huerta

1I8.S

reoeiving through Vera Crus.

Wilson

expressed his teelings to his private secretarY', Joseph P. Tumulty, bY'
saying.

"It is too bad, isn't it, but we could not allow that oargo to land.

The Jlexicans intend using those guns upon cur own boY'S.
action of this ldnd.

It ts hard to take

I have tried to keep out ot this Jlexican mess, but we

are now on the brink ot war and there i. no alternative."S8
relations were levered by Huerta.
invasion ot Mexican soila

... ------------..
31 Es.!!!.,
38

Diplomatic

EYen General Carranza protested this

"In the taoe of the real situation ot Mexioo •••

6S Cong., 2 sess., 1914, Vol. 51,6908, (H. Doc. 910).

JOleph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know H1m, Doubleday, Page &: Co.,
N.Y., 1921. 152.
- - --
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and oonsid.ring the aots oommitted at Vera Cruz to be highly ottensive to the
dignity and independenoe ot Mexioo •••• I interpr.t the 8enttRent ot the great
majority ot the Mexioan peopl•••• and invite you ••• to order your torc•• to
evacuate all places that th.,.. hold in the port ot V.ra Cruz, and to preseDt
to the Con.titutionalist Goverma.nt. which I a. Constitutional Gov.rnor of the
State of Coahuila aDd First Chiet of the Constitutionalist Army r.pr••• nt,
the demand on the part of the Unit.d Stat.s in regard to acta recently

CClll-

_itt.d at the port of ~pioo •••• ·39 The .ituation was b.coming dang.rous.

, I

Wilson had to u •••v.~ ounce ot patience to keep the .ituation steady.

He

was the lonelie.t man in Washington. 4O
At this point. on April 25th. the gov.rmaent ot Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile tendered their good ottice. to bring about .ome .olution to the problem.
Wilson acc.pt.d 1lIImediately.
stitutional govermaeat.

Still his obj.ct was re-.stablishment ot con-

Be wanted the oreation of' Ita single provisional

government acceptable to all parti ••••• upon the bas•• of such reforms as will
satisty the just claim. ot the people ot Mexico to lite. liberty and independent .8lt .upport ••'1

On Kay 18, 1914, the conter.noe began.

me.ting was held at Niagara Falls. Canada.

The first

The plan proposed by the American

r.presentatives asked for the removal ot Hu.rta, "that a provi.ional governMnt. repr.senting constitutionalist sentiment should be appointed.

--------------S9
40
41

--

For. Rels., 1914, 477-484.

Tumulty, 154.

lotter. 297.

that the
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president should be pledged to carry into ettect the 8fJ'Il rian and other
t •••• "'2
ret onas, .!..!.

The mediation accoaplished little in paoifying Mexioo but it prOBoted
Pan-Amerioan friendship.

It also enabled Wilson to maintain the status quo

in Vera Cruz until he oould withdraw the .Amerioan forces. '3
As is

_11 moWD. much pressure was brought to bear upon Huerta that on

July 15, 1914, he resigned aDd sailed for Spain.

The able and honorable

Francisco Carbajal, formerly Chief Justioe of the Supreme Court ot Mexioo and
reoently appointed Minister ot Foreign Affairs was named Provisional
President. 44
The Wilson administration justified it.elt for not reoognizing Huerta's
government because ot the fate of Madero, Buerta' s failure to hold a real
eleotion, and the fact that he did not control, at anyone time, the larger
part ot .xioo.
military

leade~

To reoognize Huerta would have ..ant reoognition ot a
and this would have given a stimulus to other military leaders

who wished to establish a military dictatorship.45

--- .....--.._--_....
42 For. Rels., 1914, 538. For further information regarding this oonterenoe,
lti proposals and ameadments eto., see pages 488 et seq.
43 Rippy, 41.

--

-

--

44 For. Rels., 1914, 563.
45 Stuart Alexander KaoCorkle, Ph.D., "Amero iean Polioy Towards Kexioo," The
Johns Hopkins u.niversi~ Studies in Historical And Politioal Soience,
!aitLaore, ¥he JobD:s Hopkins PresS; 1933, 91;' -

CHAPTER II
AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CARRANZA
Mexico was still in chaos.

Huerta was gone but the various army chiets

tought for supremaoy among themselves.

This caused the revolution to be pro-

longed a t . more years. Wilson was anxious to see a Bound. permanent government set up by Carranza.

Finally, the oonstitutionalists gained control ot

the north and entered Mexico City on August 22, 1914, seventeen months atter
Carranza began his struggle.

Be announced that he had taken charge

executive power aocording to the Plan of Guadalupe.

ot the

This plan dated March 26,

1913, deolared the prinCiples upon which the Carranza revolution was founded,
Whereas the ls gillative and judicial
powers have recognized and protected
General Huerta and his illegal and
anti-patriotic proceedings contrar,y
to constitutional laws and precepts;
••• we, the undersigned, chiets and
otfioers oommanding the oonstitutionalist toroes, have agreed upon
and shall sustain with arms the tollowing:
1. General Victoriano Huerta is hereby repudiated as President of the Republio ••••
4. For the purpose of organizing the
armywhioh is to see that our aims are
carried out, we name Venustiano Carranza,
now governor of the State of Coahuila,
as first Chief of the army which is to
be oalled "Constitutionalist Army."
5. Upon the ocoupation of the City
of Mexico by the Constitutionalist Army,

21
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the exeoutive power shall be vested in
Venustiano Carranza, its first ohief, or
in the person who will substitute him in
oommand.
6. The provisional trustee or the exeoutive power of the Republio shall oonvene
general elections as soon as peaoe may have
been restored and will surrender power to
the oitizen who may have been elected. l
This deolaration was supposed to have been signed by sixty-tour offioers of
the troops or the State of Coahuila.

With these troops Carranza, then gover-

nor or that state, began his revolution against Huerta's government after the
death ot Franoesco Madero.
Zapata and Villa were two revolutionists who oombined their toroes
against Carranza after Huerta's downfall.

Chaotic conditions became

intensitied.

Events moved rapidly. Villa repudiated the government set up

by Carranza.

Be said he was convinced that Carranza was incapable ot re-

establishing a democratic government.

On September 30, 1914, Villa issued

his manifesto which contained points against Carranza.

In the next month,

Carransa issued a Proclamation charging Villa with insincerity.

A convention

was held at AgU&scalientes consisting of all the generals in the Mexican Army
who opposed Carranza's government.

On November 2, 1914, they elected a
I

Provisional President, General Eulalio Gutierrez, Governor of the State ot
I

Luis Potosi. Eight days later
I

~his

convention deolared Carranza a rebel.

General Gutierrez appointed Villa head of the convention ar.my.

General

-----------.--1

Thomas Edward Gibbon Mexioo Under Carransa, Doubleday, Page & Co., N.Y.,
1919, 47. See also For. Re1s., 1914, 589.
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Obreg6n, head of the constitutionalist anty', deolared war on Villa.
temporarily established hi' goverument at Vera Cruz.

Carranza

On December 12, 1914,

he issued his Declaration and Decre. stating his position as executive and
his intention to hold that places
That the underasigned, in his capacity
as constitutional governor of the state
of Coahuila, had solemnly taken the oath
to observe and cau.. the general CODstitution to be observed, and that complying with this duty and of the above
oath, he was inevitably obliged to arise in arms to oppose the usurpation
of Huerta and to restore constitutional
order in the Republic of Mexico.
That, it being imperative, therefore,
that the interruption of constitutional
order should subsist during this new
period of struggle, the Plan of Guadalupe should therefore, continue to be in
foroe, as it has been the guidance and
banner of it, until the enemy may have
been overpowered completely in order
that the constitution may be restored ••• 2
Wilson tried to adjust the differences between Carranza and his enemies.
Everything was done to reach 80me settlement between the tacti ons and, at the
same time, protect the perwonal and property rights of .Americans.

To support

his return to a non-intervention policy, Wilson ordered that the American
marines leave Vera Cruz by Bovember 23, 1914. 3 Notter 8~ates that his aotion
was consistent with the essential part of Wilson's policy of building up

......... _---._--- ....

--

2 For. Rels., 1914, 629-633.

--

3 For. Rels., 1914, 690-626.

Gibbon, 48.
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friendship with Latin American countries.

During December, 1914, and

January, 1915, dissension among the rebel leaders increased.
continued to avoid armed intervention.

The president

Meanwhile, the press oontinually

oal1ed tor intervention. 4
Wilson believed some aotion should be taken.

In his June 2, 1915,

statement he oalled upon the various taotions to get together to settle their
differenoes tor Mexioo's reliet or the United States would lend its moral
support "to 801le man or group of men, if suoh may be found, who can rally the
suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they
cannot unite the warring factions of the country, return to the constitution
of the republio so long in abeyanoe, and set up a Government at Mexioo City
which the great powers of the world oan reoognize and deal with --a Government with whom the program of the revolution will be a business and not
merely a platfor.m."5

The conventionists were quarrelling among themselves,

consequently 'they were not making any headway under Carranza's control. .A.
Pan-American Conferenoe which came into being to oonsider the matter,
indicated that Carranza was the leader Who should receive their support.

The

members believed Carranza bad central authority among his forces while there
seemed to be no oentral authori~ among the Villista foroes.

The loyality and

unity among Carranza adherents indicated that he had the more strength.

--...._-..... __..... ..,--

4 Notter. 364 and 383.
5 Robinson & West, 269.

Soon

26

atter the President's June 2, 1915 address, Carranza issued a Deolaration to
the Mexican nation dated June 11, 1915, in which he said his government oontrolled over soven-eighths of the national territory, that it had organized
public administration in twenty out ot twenty-seven states ot the Republio of
Mexico, and that more than thirteen million of the fifteen million people
were under his jurisdiction.

Therefore, Carranza believed the time had come

when his government should be recogni&ed by other nations espeoially the
United States.

He also appealed to the warring factions to submit to his

government in order to obtain peace in Mexioo.

General Carranza's olaim to

recognition was aided When his confidential agent at Washington on October 7,
1915, sent copies ot his Declarations ot December 12, 1914, and June 11, 1915
to Wilson.

In this letter Carranza assured the United States that the lives

and property ot foreigners would be respeoted.

He also said that his govern-

ment would recognize indemnities tor damages caused by the revolution.

He

conoludes that the laws of retorm would be observed and the constitutional
government will respect everyone's llfe, property, and religion. 6
In the meantime Carranza reoccupied Mexico City. Atter examining the
e~ent

of Carranza's military control, it was decided by the members ot the

conterence that he possessed the essentials tor recognition.

On October 19,

1915, Wilson recognized Carranza as chier executive ot the de ~ government ot Mexico •

. .. _---._-----.,

6 "The Recognition of the De Facto Government in Mexico," The Am. Jour.
1ntemat'l ~, 1916, vOl. 10, 362-366.
-
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The Secretary of State to the Confidential
Agetlt of the !!. facto Government of Mexico
Department cf Stat.
Washington, October 19, 1915
My dear Mr. Arredondo:

It is my pleasure to inform you that
the President of the United States takes
this opportunity of extending recognition
to the de facto Government of Mexico, of
which dinera! Venustiano Carranza is the
Chief Executive. 7
Robert Lans ing

----

An article was printed in The Nation entitled "Brighter Days for Mexico" wh1c

stated that regarding recognition of Carranza a8 against the other men in the
field warring for reform aDd reconstruction, Carranza was the result of a
prooess of elimination.

His reoognition came about following the united

efforts of the republics of Latin America, "Racially and by political
experienoe they are better qualified than we to understand foroes and
personalities in Mexioo ••• •

Conferences with Latin American republics tended

to reduce their suspioions of the motives of the United States which were
brought about by big business interest. 8 At this time, Carranza was still
not able to maintain order throughout the

~ole

of Mexico.

Villa continued

to harass the country and to make raids on the American border.

Actually,

Carranza WaS not elected president until March 12, 1917. 9 Wilson gave
Carranza his baRediate support by proclaiming an e.'argo

OD

the shipment ot

--..._----.----...
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T For. Rels., 1916, 171.
8

"Brighter Days for Kex100,·
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9 For. Rels., 1911, 910.

!!!. Batio!,

October 14, 1915, 461.
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ar.mS to all anti-government partiel in Mexioo. lO But the faot that Carranza
.as not duly eleoted until much later leads one to believe that expediency
played a large part in reoognition, and it is clear that for a year and a
half WilBon was reoognizing a militarist type of government whioh he had
previously oondemned in the instance ot Huerta.
At this time, Europe was in turmoil and holding the attention of the
world. ll Wilson, in his annual message to oongress, Deoember 1, 1915, spoke
of the community of interests 8Ilong the American statess

"The moral is, that

the states of America are not hostile rivals but co-operating friends, and
that their growing sense of cOJllDlunity of interest, alike in matters politioal
and in matters economic, i. likely to give them a new significance as faotors
in international attairs and in the political histor,y of the world."l2

In

this statement one oan see that particular attention was oalled to the taot
that the president looked beyond the present value ot the growing unity of
the Latin American oountries in ideals and interests to its importanoe for tht
time ot readjustment atter the war tor the future.

After the war, the Latin

American countries would cooperate commercially for pre-w.r eoonomio adjustments. A united America would not only be an advantage against foreign
enarO'achment here but it could be of service to Europe by giving economic aid~
Dloral example, and leadership.

In his January 6, 1916, statement, Wilson

_... _-- ....... ------10 Botter, 452.
11 MaoCorkle, 93.
12 Cong.

!!!.,

64 Cong., 1 ses8., 1916, Vol. 53, 95.

28

again spoke ot his desire for friendliness and co-operation between all
American states.

He stressed the chiet features of this Pan-American

program; to guarantee to each other absolute political independence and
territorial integrity and to settle all disputes by arbitration. 13
The recognition

----

ot Carranza's de facto government did not bring peaoe.

The events in Mexico were inoreasing the difficulties of this government to
maintain its non-intervention policy.
our congressmen.

Inoidents along the border

Some demanded intervention.

eX~8perated

Then on March 8, 1916, General

Villa attaoked the town of Columbus, New Mexico and killed seventeen
Americans.

Now drastic measures had to be taken.

The president sent forces

to Mexioo to capture Villa.
The Adjutant General
to General Funston
War Department
'Washington, )(aroh 10, 1916

Prelident has direoted that an armed foree
be lent into Mexico with the lole objeot of
capturing Villa and preventing any further
raids by his band, and with scrupulous regard to sovereignty of Mexico ••• 14
IIcCain
General Carranza had given his consent reluctantly for American troops to

...
13

_----..-_..---Robinson
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West, 82.

14 For. Rela •• 1916, 483.
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pursue bandits in Mexico.

General John J. Pershing did not receive any

assistance from him to accomplish his purpose.

Carr.nza aenied him the use

of ral1w.ya tor tr.nsportation of supplies, forbade the occupation of towns,
and made no eftort of his own to oapture Villa.

In April, Carranza also re-

quested the withdrawal of Amerioan forces tram Mexioo.

Pershing believed

that he w.s actually encountering aotive opposition tram the constitutionalists:
General FUnston to the
Adjutant General
Fort Sam Houston
April 17, 1916
Following just received trom Pershing:
Bam.1quipa
April 17, 1916

•••M.y opinion ls, general attitude Carranza has been one ot obstruction. This
also universal opinion Army offioers this
expedition. Carranz. toroes report all
acts against Villa forces and death of
Vl1la leaders. Activity Carranza toroe
in territory through which we have operated probably intentionally obstructive
•••• 15
Funston
In order to reaoh .ome agreement, Lansing initiated a conference between
General Hugh S. Soott of the American forces and the constitutionalist
I

General Alvaro Obregon.

At this oonference it was revealed that Carranza

... _-----_ .... ---
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15 For. Rels., 1916, 822.

30

wished to disouss completion ot the withdrawal ot American torces.
a deaf ear to any talk of cooperation or mutual agreement.

Be turned

The War Depart-

ment retaliated by an embargo on shipments of arms and munitions to Mexico.
The final deoision given at the oonterence was that our troops lICuld be withdrawn but gradually.

Carranza refused to sign the agreement because no date

tor complete withdrawal

wa. pravided. The Mexican government pr<aised to

prevent f'urther raids on the border.

But May, 1916, brought new raids on

Glen Springs and Banqul1las. tex.s. l6
I
The conferences between Carranza's minister of' War, Obregon
and

Generals Scott and Funston held during April and May did not bring relief to
the situation.

The breaking point ooourred May 24::. 1916.

On thb date,

Carranza sent an ill-tempered note to the United States' Department of' State.
In its sharp and bitter terms it charged the American government with bad
taith and demanded the immediate withdrawal ot American toroes trom Mexico.
He asked this government of ita true intention toward Mexico •

• ••

The Mexican Government oonsiders it
neoessary to take advantage of this opportunity to request of the ..American
Government a more oategorical detinition of' ita true intentions toward Mexioo
•••• The American Government for some
time paat haa been making assuranoe of
friendship to the Latin Amerioan
people, and has taken aavantage
ot every opportunity to convinoe
them that it wishes to respeot

..... _----_.._---16

--
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their sovereignty absolu't;ely.
Espeoially with respeot to Mexioo the Amerioan Government has
deolared on various occasions that
it was not its intention to intervene
in any manner in its interior affairs and that it desires to leave
it to our countr,r to work out alone
its diffiault and varied problema
of politioal and social transformation ••••
The Mexioan Government has, nevertheless, to confess that the acts of
the Amerioan military authorities are
in direot oontradiotion to the statements above referred to, and finds
itself forced, therefore, to appeal
to the President, the Department of
State, the senate and the American
people, for a definition ••• of the
true political intentions of the
United States as regards Mexico ••••
The Mexican Government invites
the Government of the United States
to bring about a oessation of this
situation of uncertainty between the
two countries and to support its
deolarations and assuranoes of
friendship with real and effeotive
a.ots whioh shall convince the Mexioan people of the sinoerity of its
proposa.ls. These acts at the moment
can not be other than the immediate
withdrawal of the American troops
which are to-day on Mexican terrltory •••• 17
C. Aquilar
This brought on a deadlock in the relations between Mexico and the
United States. Withdrawal of troops without sucoess would be a blow to
Wilson's prestige during a presidential election year.

The troops stayed.

17 Foreie: Relations, 1916, 552-563. C. Aquilar was Secretary of Foreign
Relations of the de facto government of Mexico.
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War seemed imminent.

If Wilson bad taken this opportunity to sever rela-

tiona with Mexico for the redress of American wrongs, he would have had a
united nation backing him.

Even if the

~

facto government was not respon-

sible for the raids, its attitude towards them was indifferent and almost
suspicious.

The Pershing expedition was the result of many wrongs which

the de facto government had not even attempted to correct.

With Carranza's

help, it is believed that Villa could have been captured.

But, in explana-

tion of Carranza's actions, he was probably suspicious of the United states.
This country had occupied Haiti in 1915 and Santo Domingo in 1916.

18

Also,

there were many stories in the American press oalling for annexation of
Mexioo to the United States.
On June 20, 1916, Wilson sent his answer to Carranza.

In it he stated

his refusal to withdraw the American marines as long as they constituted
the only check against intolerable grievanoes and bandit outrages:
•••

The Government of the United States
has viewed with deep concern and inoreasing disappointment the progress
of the revolution in Mexico. Continuous bloodshed and disorders have
marked its progress. For three years
the Mexican Republic has been torn with
civil strife; the lives of Americans
and other aliens have been sacrificed;
vast properties developed by American
capital and enterprise bave been
destroyed or rendered nonproductive;
bandits have been permitted to roam
-~-------------

18

Gruening, 591.

\

33

at will through the territor,y contiguous to the United States and to seize,
without punishment or without effective
attempt at punishment, the property
of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States who ventured
to remain in Mexican territor,y or to
return there to proteot their interests,
have been taken, and in some cases
barbarously taken, and the murderers
have neither been apprehended nor
brought to justice ••••
In these attacks on American territory, Carranoista adherents, and
even Carrancista soldiers took part
in the looting, burning and killing.
Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but
uncivilized acts of mutilation were
perpetrated •••• Since these attacks,
leaders of the bandits well known
both to Mexican civil and military
authorities as well as to American
officers have been enjoying with
impunity the liberty of the towns
of northern Mexico. So far has the
indifference of the de facto Government to these atrocities gone that
some of these leaders, as I am advised, have received not only the
protection of the Government, but
encouragement and aid as well.~ ••
In the face of these depredations
not only on American lives and property
on Mexican soil but on American soldiers,
citizens and homes on American territory, the perpetrators of which General Carranza was unable or possibly
considered it inadvisable to apprehend and punish, the United States had
no recourse other than to employ force
to disperse the bands of Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness
systematically raiding across the international boundary •••

f
34

In conolusion, the Mexican Government invites the United States to support its tlassurances of friendship
with real and effective acts" which
can be no other than the immediate
withdrawal of the American troops.
For the reasons I have herein fully
set forth, this request of the de
facto Government can not now be-entertained. The United States has not
sought the duty which has been forced
upon it of pursuing bandits who under
fundamental principles of municipal
and international law, ought to be
pursued and arrested and punished by
Mexican authorities... If, on the contrary, the de facto Government is pleased
to ignore thIs obligation and to believe
that It in case of a refusal to retire
these troops there is no further reoourse than to defend its territory
by an appeal to arm ••• It the execution
of this threat will lead to the gravest
consequence ••• While this Government
would deeply regret such a result, it
cannot recede from its settled determination to maintain its national
rights and to perform its full duty
in preventing further invasions of
the territory of the United States and
in removing the peril whioh Americans
along the international boundary have
borne so lon with patience and forbearance •••• 9

y

The events which followed were even more ominous.

On the evening of

June 21st, hostilities broke out at Carrizal between Pershing's and Carranza
forces.

Some United States cavalry men were killed and others taken prisoner

In foroeful terms Lansing demanded the release of the Amerioan prisoners.

19 Foreign Relations, 1916, 581-592.
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There was more to follow.

On June 26th, at Tampico, an American naval

launch from the U.S.S. Marietta was fired on without warning by Constitutionalist forces.

On July 4th, the

~

facto government suggested that the

offer of mediation from the Latin American countries be accepted.
July 28th, the United states sent a note of acceptance.
20
lieved.

On

Wilson was re-

To date, Wilson's policy was considered unsuccessful for our relations
with Mexico were still strained.

The Columbus massacre remained unpunished,

Americans on the border were still being killed.
in retaliation in Texas.

Mexicans were also killed

After the Carrizal incident, Wilson spoke before

the Associated Advertising clubs at Philadelphia, June 29, 1916, rebuking
those who advocated conquest of Mexico:
I believe ••• that America ••• should be
ready in every point of policy and of
action to vindicate at whatever cost
the principles of liberty. of justice,
and of humanity to which we have
been devoted from the first.... It
is easy to think first of the material
interest of America, but it is not easy
to think first of what Amerioa, if she
loves justioe ought to do in the field
of international affairs. I believe
that at whatever cost America should
be just to other peoples and treat
other peoples as she demands that
they should treat her. 2l

------------ -...
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Ibid., 593-600.

21

Congo
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64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1302.
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In his June 30th, 1916, address before the Press Club at New York he was
more emphatic.

He stated here that it was an easy thing to strike against

another nation but striking was no way to oonserve the honour of the nation:
••••• The easiest thing is to strike. The
brutal thing is the impulsive thing ••••
Do you think the glory of America
would be enhanced by a war of oonquest
in Mexico? Do you think that any. aot
of violenoe by a powerful nation like
this against a weak and destruotive
neighbor would refleot distinotion upon
the annals of the United States?
••.•• ! have oonstantly to remind myself
that I am not the servant of those who
wish to enhanoe the value of their
Mexioan investments, that I am the
servant of the rank and. file of the
people of the United States •••• 22
Then on July 4, 1916, the president said:
•••• .Amerioa did not oome into existence
to make one more great nation in the
family of nations, to show its strength
and to exercise its mastery. America
opened her doors to everybody who wanted
to be free and to have the same opportunity that everybody else had to make
the most of his faculties and his opportunities and America will retain its
greatness only so long as it retains
and seeks to realize those ideals. No
man ought to suffer injustioe in Amerioa.
No man ought in America to fail to see
the dictates of humanity.23

22

Conj2.

~.,

64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, App. 1315.
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64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, APp. 1396.
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Again on .July 10, 1916, the president continued to emphasize his principle
of justice and fairness:
What makes Mexico suspicious of us is
that she does not believe as yet that we
want to serve her. She believes that we
want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which
some of our fellow ci,tizens have tried to
exploit her privileges and possessions.
For my part, I will not serve the ambitions of these gentlemen, but I will try
to serve all America, so far as inter~
oourse with Mexico is oonoerned, by
trying to serve Mexico herself.... Of
oourse, we must make good our own sovereignty of Mexioo. 24
The mediation commission held its first meeting on September 6, 1916.
Th~

held numerous sessions but did not conclude their deliberations until

1917.

But hampered by conflicting intentions, the conventions never resulted

in an agreement which Carranza would accept.

Meanwhile, intervention and

war had been avoided and the serious orises had passed. 25
The president in his 1916 campaign speeches discussed his foreign policy.
On September 2, 1916, in accepting the nomination of the Demooratic Party for

a seoond term as President, he justified his actions in Mexico and emphasized
the signifioance of Latin American relations for the future.

Regarding

Mexico, his ideal was to respeot the sovereignty of the Mexioan people and
help them to do away with misrule and foreign control.

Again, as before, he

plaoed Amerioan eoonomic power in a plaoe of service to American ideals.

------------.. -24

Cong. Reo., 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, Vol. 53, .App. 1480.

25 Notter, 535.
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The president defended the charge that the Pershing expedition violated his
principles.

He said that the marines and soldiers entered Mexioo to vindi-

oate the sovereignty of the United States, a duty which Mexico was unable to
accomplish and we did so without obstruction to the sovereign authority of
Mexico.

Some condemned his policy of non-recognition of Huerta.

In answer,

he said that he would not extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtained
power by treachery and violence. 26
As the Pershing expedition came to an end a new problem was coming to a
head. Withdrawal of Amerioan marines occured a week before Germany declared
unrestrioted U-boat warfare.

Carranza was elected President of Mexico, not

by popular vote, but by the Mexican Congress sitting as an eleotoral college,
Maroh 12, 1917. 27 E!~ recognition was extended to Mexico by the United
States on August 31, 1917.

28

At this time, President Wilson's attentions were drawn elsewhere as he
was concerned with the United States entering the great European conflict.
As far as his Mexioan policy was concerned, the matter was ended.

Future

difficulties involved protection of Amerioan rights under Mexioo's Consti29
tution of 1917 drawn up by Carranza and his adherents.

26

Cong.

27

Notter, 618.
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29 Notter, 618.
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CHAPTER III
THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917
Carranza was an improvement over Huerta but he left much to be desired
as a chiet magistrate.

1

With Carranza as president ot Mexico, some ot the

more anxious problems between the United States and Mexican relations tram

1917 on were oonoerned with property rights whioh were included in the new
Mexican Constitution ot 1917. 2 In this constitution ma~ ot the promises
made by the Mexioan goverDlDent under Carranza were broken.

He had stated

that when he beoame established in the oity ot Mexico, he would call for the
election ot oongressmen.

He did not do so.

In 1915, he oalled a constitu-

tional convention to enact a new constitution disregarding the one promulgated in 1857 Whioh he had pledged himself to uphold.

The Constitution ot

1857 had been adopted by a vote ot all the representatives ot the Mexican
people but when he called tor the election ot delegates to the oonstitutional
convention, some ot the states of Mexioo were still not under his oontrol.
These states were not notitied, oonsequently, all the oities of Mexioo were
not represented. 3

--------------1 Josephus Daniels, The Lite of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1924, Will H. Johnson,
1924,185.
--2 Gruening, 595-596.
3 Gibbon, 55-56.
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The artioles most oommented upon were those oonoerned with labor,
religion, and the nationalization of the oountry's subsoil produots.
Priestley comments on the Constitution of 1917, as follows:
Whatever the benefits of the new oonstitution, these were not the features whioh
gave it its great notoriety. The salient
points of interest in it are its new applioation
of the principle of eminent domain and its
care, metioulously expressed, for the welfare
of the laboring olasses. With these also
marches the determination to destroy the evils
of authoritative control of the people by the
church either through education or religion.
It is dedicated to the rule of reason and of
the proletariat ••• and it embodies the theory
of social reorganization in the exhaustive
way in which it attempts to protect the laboring olass and forestall all its difficulties.
It is in faot an attempt to institute a
r'gime of state sooialism. 4
The author further oomments that these prOVisions on labor under Article 123
of the constitution are theoretical, not praotioal.

This is dangerous for

they try to create conditions rather than control existing ones.

Some of

the provisions which would be ideal for a highly industrialized society
would prove the direct opposite when applied to domestic laborers.

There

are, however, some admirable qualities in this article such as special favor
given women and ohild labor, minimum wage prOVisions, an eight hour day,
and aooident oompensation, ~.5

Arthur Constantine, a special oorres-

pondant in Mexioo during this period oomments on Artiole 123 as follows:

4 Priestley, 436-437.
5 Ibid., 437.

~--------------------------------~
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The socialistic influences which have been
active among the Mexican revolutionists since
the days of Madero have resulted in the incorporation in the new constitution of such radical (or advanced) legislation as the eight
hour day •••• These are the salient features
of the new Mexican Constitution now in force •••
Now that the dominant faction has obtained
what it has so often stated it was fighting
for. the hour of the test of its patriatism
arrives ••• Those who have lived in Mexico
during the comings and goings of revolutionary factions surmise that the test will try
the soul of more than one patriot. 6
James Lord, Treasurer of the Pan-American Federation of Labor and member of
the Labor Commission to visit Mexico in 1918 writes that at that time labor
was in a bad state of affairs.

Carranza's government was a state socialist

government, they did not believe in labor unions. instead. advocated government control of industries to take charge of labor conditions, wages. and
general welfare of the workers.

He further claims that the Mexican worker

never received enough wages to enable him to obtain a more substantial diet
than frijoles and tortillas.

This did not give him enough strength for the

work he was expected to do. consequently, his efficiency was low.

The

author advocates better environment. food. and general conditions for the
workers to be shown in their homes, hygene and cleanliness.

Finally, he

conoludes, the way to help Mexico is to help without trespassing, "to give
them an opportunity to save themselves, and we will then see what they

--------------S Arthur Constantine, "The New Mexioan Constitution and Reforms,"
Outlook, March 14, 1917. 456.
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_ill do. n7

As for Carranza, he was a disappointment to the Mexioan workers

who helped him into power.
him.

Their land of promise never materialized through

8

Franois Kelley in his book, Blood-Drenohed Altars, writes with authority on the religious perseoution in Mexioo.

This situation permeated

throughout the oonstitution under many of its artioles.

Artiole 3 prohibits

any religion from establishing or direoting primary sohools. 9 The artiole
itself reads as follows:
Instruotion is free; that given in publio
institutions of learning shall be seoular. Primary instruotion, whether higher or lower, given
in private institutions shall likewise be seoular.
No religious corporation nor minister of
any religious oreed shall establish or direot
sohools of primary instruetion.
Private primary schools may be established
only subject to offioial supervision.
Primary instruction in publio institutions shall be gratuitous. lO
Artiole 130 goes further; it ordered the confiscation of schools erected
for teaohing religion and provided that all primary sohool matters be placed
under the direotion of the federal government.
to ohurohes.

No legal status was given

It also forbade any Mexioan to be a minister of any religious

7

James Lord, "Labor in MeXiCO," Mexioo and the Caribbean, G. E. Steohert
& Co., N.Y., 1920, edited by George H:lrlakeslee, 91-103

8

~.,

9

Francis Clament Kelley, Blood-Drenohed Altars, The Bruce Publishing Co.,
Milwaukee, 1935, 261.

103.

10 H. N. Branch, "The Mexioan Constitution of 1917 Compared with the Consti tution of 18571'1, ~ Annuals ~ ~ American Aca.demy 2! PoU tica.l !
Sooial Soience, Ma , supp., 1917 2.
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creed, under penalty of loss of oitizenship.

It prohibited ministers from

receiving a legaoy for the benefit of a religious organization.

ll

Artiole

130 reads:
The Federal authorities shall have
power to exercise in matters of religious
worship and outward ecolesiastioal forms
such intervention as by law authorized. ~l
other offioials shall aot as auxiliaries to
the Federal authorities ••••
The law recognizes no juridicial personality in the religious institutions known
as ohurohes.
Only a Mexioan by birth may be a minister
of any religious oreed in Mexioo.
No ministers of religious creeds shall,
either in publio or private meetings, or in
aots of worship or religious propaganda,
criticise the fundamental laws of the oountry,
the authorities in particular or the Government in general; they shall have no vote, nor
be eligible to office, nor shall they be
entitled to assemble for political purposes •••
Ministers of religious oreeds are incapable legally of inheriting by will from ministers of the same religious oreed or from any
private individual to whom they are not related
by blood within the fourth deoree. l2
Artiole 5 further states that the law does not permit the establishment of
monastio orders of whatever denomination or for whatever purpose oontemplated.

This artiole, Kelley comments, was inoorporated to strike at reli-

gious organizations other than Catholio. 13

The domination of the state

over the church was complete under Article 37 in which ohurohes are deprived

11

Kelley, 262-266.

12

Branoh, 103-106.

13 Kelley, 262.
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of proteotion beoause they oannot appeal to oongress or to the oourts to
enforoe property rights.

If ohuroh authorities merely petitioned against

oonfisoation, they lost their oitizenshiP;14 sinoe Article 37 provides that:
Citizenship shall be lost;
•••
III By compromising themselves in anyway
before ministers of any religious creed or
before any other person not to observe the
present constitution, or the laws arising
thereunder. l5

In regard to the

presiden~

of Mexico, in Article 82 he is forbidden to belong

to any eoolesiastioal state, "The President of the Republic shall have the
following qua1ifications: ••• 5e shall not belong to the eco1esiastical state
nor be a minister of any religious creed ••• n16

Finally, Artiole 24 states

that "Everyone is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to practice
all ceremonies, devotions, or observances of his respeotive creed, either in
plaoes of publio worship or at home, provided they do not constitute an
offence punishable by law".

But to make sure that actually no one will be

this free. Article 130 provides that as the law is now enforced, family
prayer at home would oonstitute an illegal religious act.

17

Francis Kelley plaoes more of the blame for religious perseoution on
I

Obregon and Calles than upon Carranza.

He said that Carranza was "between

--------------14

~.,

262-263.

15 Branoh, 31-32.
16

Ibid., 63-64.

17 Branoh, 15 for Article 24, 103-106 for Article 130.
been quoted on pages 42 and 43 of this chapter.

Article 130 has

!

I

II
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two tires."

I

Obregon had deserted him and made an agreement with the radi-

oals who wanted nothing less than oomplete destruotion of the ohurch.
the other hand, Carranza had made certain pledges to Wilson.

On December 23,

1918, he went before the Me%ican Congress to ask for a modification of
Article 130 of the Constitution:
Without flinohing I have oome before the
Congress suggesting amendments to our Supreme
Law. In doing this I have no motive other
than a sinoere desire to restore harmony
between the word ot the law and the uni ver- .
sally aooepted prinoiples ot common justice.
In suggesting that you enact into law the
bill I herewith submit, I cherish the hope
the Congress will understand that my motive
today is that which it has always been,
namely, to give more weighty consideration
to the welfare of the people as a whole than
to the demands 0 f any group no matter how
honorable it may claim to be.
The bill I now enclose would amend
Article 130 of the Constitution adopted
at Quer~taro, to insure respect for liberty
of conscience that has been so highly esteemed in Mexico as an inalienable human
right, removing provisions which abridge
that liberty to a degree not consistent
with correct morality and not in the public
interest, which provisions moreover are not
in harmony with the postulates of modern
civilization, are a denial ot true liberty
and violate the statute itself under whioh
the political organism of our country funotions •••• Those who adopted the constitution of 1857, had no hesitation in admitting
that in Mexico there should be liberty of
worship and liberty of conscience. It they
did not embody it in the constitution it was
through an excessive devotion to the complete separation of Church and State by
whioh they denied their own jurisdiction

On

~-~--------------~
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in any religious matter. The legislators
of that day were so scrupulous in this
matter that they refrained from even the
mention of religion. This was due doubtless to the faot that the delegates to the
1857 Constitutional Convention had entered
into an agreement not to introduce any
provision that would place any restriction
whatever on the liberty of conscienoe whioh
itself is guaranteed by the oonstitution
they adopted •••• Not before the promulgation
of the 1857 Constitution did civil administration in Mexico take on a purely seoular
character. Confusing the law of the
ohurch with the law of the state a mystical
character was given to government, and it
would have been altogether natural for
the legislature to regulate matters of
worship. Nevertheless legislatures scrupulously abstained from doing so •••• The
abridgment of the liberty of the ?uman
conscience as is done in the Queretaro
Constitution has no antecedent in our
national legislation, no precedent even
analogous is to be found for this provision whioh I ask you to amend. I have
searched our national record in vain, I
have examined every effort made to curb
the alleged abuses of religion, I have
found nowhere anything that even had the
faintest appearanoe of a mandate from the
nation for any law that interferes with
worship. Even in the Reform Laws, enacted
at a time when laicism was firmly in the
saddle, there is no clause which interferes
with the details of worship •••• I hold
that, even if we take nothing else into
consideration, the very fact that in our
civil law there is no basis for any act
that would prescribe or regulate the internal
affairs of any religion without violating
the principle of non-intervention which is
traditional in Mexico, you oannot fail to
see the justice of the reoommendation I
make that Article 130 be amended. 18

18

Kelley, 241-244.
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The Mexican Congress refused to act upon his December 23rd recommendation.
Mexico City became a scene of intrigue and revolt for the next two years.
The section of the constitution which involved Mexico in international
complications is concerned with the nationalization of the country's
natural resources as expressed in Article 27.

This article vested in the

Mexican nation the ownership of all mineral and oil resources and asserts
that direct domination by the nation over these subsoil products was
oooassioned for the good of society.

19

Article 21:
The ownership of lands and waters
comprised within the limits of the national
territory is vested originally in the Nation,
which has had, end has, the right to transmit
title thereof to private persons, thereby
constituting private property ••••
The Nation shall have at all times the
right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand as
well as the right to regulate the development
of national resources, which are susceptible
of appropriation, in order to conserve them and
equitably to distribute the public wealth.
For this purpose necessary measures shall be
taken to divide large landed estates; to
develop small landed holdings; ••• Wherefore,
all grants of lands made up to the present
time under the decree of January 6, 1915,
are confirmed.
Private property acquired for the
said purposes shall be considered as taken
for public utility.
In the Nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances which in
veins, layers, masses, or beds constitute

----_-.----- .. --19 Priestley, 437.
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deposits whose nature is different from the
components of the land. such as minerals fram
which metals and metaloids used for industrial
purposes are extracted; beds of precious stones,
rock salt and salt lakes formed directly by
marine waters, ••• phosphates which may be used
for fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum
and all hydrocarbons - solid. liquid or gaseous •••
Legal capacity to acquire ownership of
lands and waters of the nation shall be governed
by the follOwing provisionsl
I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization
and Mexican companies have the right to acquire
ownership in lands . . .ters and their appurten- .
ances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines.
waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of
Mexico •••
II. The religious institutions known as
churches, irrespective of creed, shall in nc
case have legal capacity to acquire, hold or
administer real property or loans made on suoh
real propert,y; ••• Places or public worship are
the propert,y of the Bation, ••• Episcopal residenoes, rectories. seminaries, orphan a.,ylums
or collegiate establishments of religious institutions ••• a~ other buildings built or designed
tor the administration. propaganda. or teaching
of the tenets of a~ religious creed shall forthwith vest. as of full right. directly in the
Bation •••
All contraots and concessions made by tormer governments from and after the year 1816
which shall have resulted in the monopoly of
lands, waters and natural resources ot the
Bation by a single individual or corporation,
are declared subject to revision, and the Executive is authorized to decl~re those null ~nd
void which seriously prejudice the public
interest. 20
Disregarding Article 14 of the a.me constitution which forbade retroactive laws, Article 21 gave retroactive power which affected lands that
~---------.-.-.

20 Branch. 15-25.
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.ere acquired before adoption of the new oonstitution on the theory that
the nation never had the right to alienate subsoil produots.

It was oon-

tended by the present government in Mexioo that nlaz violated Artiole 72 of
the Constitution ot 1857 when he legislated in favor ot alienation of the
21
subsoil produots.
Gibbons states that under the laws of 1857, solid mineral ruels; petroleum, and all hydrooarbons (solid, liquid, gaseous)
22
belonged to the owners of the lands in which they existed.
Constantine
brings forth an important point regarding the nationalization ot subsoil
produots:
Of course, any nation may, it it thillks
wise, legally - whether justly or not is
another question - nationalize its land provided it compensates foreign owners under
international agreements satisfaotory to the
owners and the nations to which they owe
allegianoe and trom whioh they are entitled
to protection. This however, does not seem
to be contemplated in the Carranza document. 2S
Petroleum oonditions remained a probles all during Carranza's reign.
eign interest wanted Article 27 amended to protect their rights.

For-

To put

Article 27 into ettect, Carranza issued decrees stating that all those who
olaim to be owners ot petroleum lands must file statements of the lands
they olaim and pay rentals and royalties to the government in order to be

-.._ ....

-_.._.-_..

21

Priestley, 438.

22

Gibbons, 59.

23
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allowed to continue in their operation. 24 Petroleum companies organized
themselves and refused to comply with Carranza's decrees.

In 1920, Carranza

made oonoeasions to oil men to the point of allOWing them to resume drilling.
This was done without prejudioe to either side in the legal controversy.
Before a conolusion was reached, Carranza was driven from power. 25
E. D. Trowbridge, formerly General Manager of the Mexican Light and
Power Company in Mexico City commented that the Constitution was strongly
anti-oapitalistic.

This aroused the hostility of the capitalistic class.

Consequently, the chances tor securing money necessary for reoonstruction
was diminished.
radioal one.

The assembly that adopted the oonstitution was an extremely

The reforms were so drastio, they deteated their awn ends. 26

The reason for the non-fullfilment of the promises made by the Carranza
government was the military situation whioh treated banditry and rebellion
as an opportunity for self-enriohment; and also the chaotic oonditions of
the internal attairs.
use.

The constitution was too idealistic tor practioal

Instead of trying to better conditions in affairs which menaced the

life of the people; it undertook to revolutionize the government on a
"socialistio theory while a corrupt military oligarchy and a none too honest
set ot civilian ofticers vitiated whatever was good in the new plan by the
27
most oynical grafting."
The condition was not nsw with Carranza, and will

--------------24 Frederio R. Kellogg, "The Mexican Oil Situation", Mexico and the Caribbean, 60.
--- -25 Priestley, 60.
26

E. D. Trowbridge, "Reoonstruotion Problems in Mexioo," )(exico
Caribbean, 110.

27 Priestley, 443.
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not disappear suddenly under one goverDment.

It was believed that the tirst

step in the development ot the Mexioan people toward selt-government would
come through a peaoeful and stable method ot transmitting the presidenta1
otfice.

But Carranza wished to retire only in place ot a man who would oon-

tinue his program.

I

Be made a tatal mistake when he quarreled with Obregon

who at this time was the most prominent man in the party and stronger militarily than the president.
a year and a halt.

Suooessors to Carranza waged their oampaigns tor

This oondition contributed to more unrest and disorder.
I

In January, 1920, Obregon lead in the raoe, he was a popular idol and the
only man ever to deteat Villa. 28 Other men in the oampaign were Ambassador
Ignaoio Bonillas, who returned to Mexioo trom the United States to quioken
I

his oandidaoy; General Pablo Gonzalez, who surrendered his military oommand
in the south to begin his tormal oampaign; and Adolto de la Huerta, governor

ot the state ot Agua Prieta in Sonora.
to leave Mexioo City tor Vera Cruz.

Carranza's government was planning

The remaining generals still loyal to

Carranza advised him to resign not later than May 15th.

Priestley in his

account ot the exodus shows that Carranza was not only making his escape
with the goverDment records but also the funds:
Twenty-one trains, oollected and equipped
at great eifort, were to oarry away 20,000
troops, oarloads ot reoords, and millions
ot treasure. The dispatohes said 27,000,000
pesos were taken, but, atter the disaster,
Pastor Rouaix, ex-seoretary ot Agrioulture,
upon returning to )(exioo on )laY 18 with the
booty, said that it was worth 100,000,000
pesos. 29

----_
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Along with the troops went the employees of the
Supreme Court.

State~

the Cabinet, and the

Attaoks were made upon the oonvoy from the outset.

Trains

were out off, traoks torn up, and railroad «mployees killed or wounded.
Finally~

esoape by rail was given up and Carranza set out for the Puebla

Mountains.

He was unsucoessful for on )(ay 18th he met his death while
30
asleep in a mountain shaok at Tlaxcalantongo~ in the State of puebla.

Kelly, in his account of Carranza's death states that in the attack made
upon Carranza's hut, he believes that someone of Carranza's own party MUst
have been responsible for there were three others sleeping in the hut and
only Carranza was killed. 3l
On May 2 5th~ Adolfo de la Huerta was chosen substitute president by
the reorganized Congress to serve to the end of Carranza's term, November 20,
1920.

In

1921~

I

Obregon became head of the Mexican Government.

He was not

recognized by the United States beoause of the offensive Article 27 of the
Constitution of 1917.

I

In 1923, Obregon agreed to validate subsoil and min-

era! rights obtained prior to 1917 and the United States resumed diplomatic
relations. 32
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CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATIONS OF WILSON'S MEXICAN POLICY
Generally speaking, Wilson's foreign policy was fundamentally the beliet
in man himself and faith in demooraoy.

Upon the soundness ot the demooratio

prinoiple he based all his other beliets.

He believed that all nations

should regard every other nation as its equal.

If disputes should develop

between nations, the only proper way to settlement was by arbitration.

This

was examplied by his immediate acceptanoe of mediation from Latin Amerioa in
disputes with Mexioo.

Ultimately, he believed that foroe should never be

used by nations to settle disputes but should be used only to resist aggression. Wilson, however, had diffioulty oarrying out his polioy.

There was

the oonstitution and laws of his own oountry, its treaties, and the obligationa inourred by previous administrations, and rules of international law.
Another element which oonditioned the direction of foreign affairs was the
pressure brought to bear by publio opinion.

Beoause of his faith in dam-

ocracy, he wished to fulfill the desires of the peoplee

Therefore, his

speeches and messages were directed toward informing and moulding public
opinion. Wilson was sincere about the principles he expounded.

Robinson

states that others have held to the same prinoiples as did Wilson but few had
the courage to apply them in foreign relations.

His firm belief in demo-

oratia principles led him to submit his foreign policy to the test of public
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opinion.

He believed the public should be intormed and they should be

allowed to discuss the issue among themselves.

This belief in democracy

was responsible for his plan to leave the Mexican people to work out their
own problems.

He refused to allow the United States to assume responsibili-

ties toward its own citizens insofar as it would carry the risk of interfering with the political life of other people.

Other people of other

nations were better off without the help ot the United States it such aid
meant JIOrtgage of their :t\tture independence.
supremacy ot law.

He undyingly adhered to the

He insisted that constitutional methods be tollowed when

administrations were changed in the Latin American countries.

He could not

oondone with reoognition Huerta's elevation to the presidency because it
was, Wilson thought, obtained by such trickery.

1

There were three elements that were dominant in Wilson's foreign policy.
First, he believed that nations as well as individualS should contorm to
the JIOral laws.

Nations are obliged to be just, to curb exploitation among

nations as individuals are obliged to do within nations.

Seoondly, he

believed the people ot various countries had the right to and were also
oapable,it permitted, of ruling themselves.
justice.

He always tavored selt-government.

bet.een selt-government and democraoy.

Liberty was second only to
He showed the distinction

Democracy, he regarded as the tinal

development ot maturity in selt-government, the full expression ot seltgovernment.

The bases ot both were the same, a developed sense ot law,

.._------ .. -.....-....
1 Robinson and West, 150-154.
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a political consoiousness. experience in obeying the law and the dictates of
morality.

rhe third great element of Wilson's foreign policy was his con-

oeption of the Un! ted States and its mission. Wilson believed that our
real purpose as a nation was to set up a goverDm8nt by the people and to
demonstrate by example the principle of right.

Our duty was to be a model

of democracy, to give examples of righteousness to the world, and work for
the rights of men and their happiness.

He also believed that promoting

America's material prospertywas important to show ourselves sincere in
carrying out our mission.

rhe material interest in our foreign policy was

to be subordinated to the higher interests of national dignity, honor, and
duty.

Here again, there were factors which made the mission difficult.

One important one was the pressure put on goveruments to uphold American
property rights, wherever they were justified, within this limit, that the
government would not be committed to support special interest or to use
force.

Dollar diplomacy was repudiated. Wilson was oonvinoed that the

world was beooming inter-dependent.
after the Spanish-American War.

Isolationism was a milestone passed

Peace would result if nations would realiZe

their moral responsibilities, aocept all nations as equals, do away with
exploitation, and faithtully keep all treaty pledges. 2 ~l in all, Wilson
oonsidered himself at onoe a reformer of and a orusader for democratic
ideals as far as the

~atin

Americans were concerned.

He was, according to

many opponents of his policy, still the schoolmaster trying to teaoh the
little nations of the Americas how to behave.

--------------2 Botter, 651-654.
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Tumulty, Wilson's Secretary, in his writings about the president, said
that in his inauguration address in March ot 1913 he stated that legitimate
property claims would be respected, but that those who believed that the
ohief business of this government is tc promote their private or oorporate
interests were due tor a disappointment.

The president expressed more

interest in the masses than in the speoial groups.

Resisting the urgings

of American industrial interests in Mexioo was a great problem to the president.

~hose

who wanted intervention were those with large land and indus-

trial holdings there.
enriohment.

To them, intervention in Mexioo was a polioy of

Wilson reoeived bitter oriticism as a result of this -Watoh-

ful waiting" policy.

He was disheartened by the taot that most of the

criticism came trom his own cabinet otficers - they believed it too idealistic.

The heart ot his polioywas expressed by him when he said, "I am

more interested in the fortunes ot oppressed men, women, and children than
in any property rights whatever.... So long as the pawer of reoognition
rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the
hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republio by treachery and violence •••• • 3 Wilson vindicates his policy of -Watohful waiting"
when he said to Tumult,. in June of 1916:
•••were I considering the matter trom
the standpoint of my own political
fortunes, and its influence upon the
result of the next election, I should
at once grasp this opportunity and

----- ... _-------3 Tumulty, 142-149.
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inTade Mexico for it would mean the
triumph of my administration. But this
has never been in my thoughts for a
siDgle moment. The thing that daunts
me and holds me back is the aftermath
of war, with all its tears and tragedies
••• I will not resort to war against
Mexico until I have exhausted eTery means
to keep out of this mess ••• Time, the
great solvent, will, I am sure, vindioate
this policy of humanity and forbearance.
Ken forget what is back of this struggle
in )lexico. It is the age-long struggle
of a people to come into their own, and
while we look upon the incidents in the
foreground, let us not fOrget the tragic
reality in the background which towers
above this whole sad picture •••• Tumulty,
some day the people of America will know
why I hesitated to intervene in Kexioo.
I cannot tell them now for we are at
peaoe with the great power whose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the
present terrible condition of affairs in
)lexioo. German propagandists are there
now, fomenting strife and trouble between
our countries. Germany is anxious to have
us at war with Mexico so that our minds
and our energies will be taken off the
great war across the sea. She wishes an
uninterrupted opportunity to carryon her
submarine warfare and believes that war
with Mexico will keep our hands off her
and thus give her liberty of action to do
as she pleases on the high seas. It begina to look as if war with Germany is
ineTitable. If it should come - I pray
God it may not - I do not wish America's
energies and forces divided, for we will
need eTery ounce of reserTe we have to
lick Germany. Tumulty, we must try patience
a little longer and await the deve1opment. 4

---.-_ _------...

-

4 Ibid., 157-160.
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Tumu1t7 concludes that the Zimmerman note (Januar,y 19, 1911) proves
that German intrigue was busy in Mexico.

The president spoke again about

this German infiltration in a Flag Day address, delivered at Washington
on June 14, 1911:
They (German7) sought b7 violence to
destroy our industries and arrest our
commerce. They tried to inoite »exioo
to take up arms against us and to draw
Japan into a hostile alliance with them;
and that, not b7 indirection, but b7
direot suggestion froa the Foreign Offioe at Berlin. 5
In view of developments in the ear17 part of 1911 when the German intrigue
into Mexioo was disoovered, it ma7 be that the oontinuation of Wilson's
humane and christian po1ic7was forced upon him since the United States
would have been in a precarious position to deal with Ger.many if a war with
Mexico had resulted. S
Houston vindicates "V1ilson's policy toward Mexioo.

He said that the

president saved the United States from the "shameles8 disgrace of a war
with the downtrodden, hapless, and helpless people of Mexico."

In regard

to the criticism the president received for taking Vera Cruz, he answers
with a question:

"VIhat would the critics bave said if the president bad

failed to sustain Admiral Mayo?,,1

I

:111,

I'!
III

Wilson denounced Huerta because Wilson believed that he had assumed
legislative power violating all constitutional law and thereb7, destroyed

---... ---------5

~.,

160.

S Josephus Daniels, 181.
1 David Houston, Righi Years with Wilson' 8 Cabinet, 1913-1920, Doubleday,
.f
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all possibilit,y of fair and free elections. Wilson could not bring himself
to recognize such a president.

The president's attitude since the death of

Madero was the subject of a great deal of discussion all culminating in many
differences of opinion.

Some believed that the president set up an imprac-

tical standard for Mexico and others believed in the doctrine that internal
changes in a state do not affect its international position; they say that
he has confused the recognition of new states with the recognition of new
governments.

One of the major issues which brought on a great deal of discussion
tor and against Wilson's polioywas the issue involving the sending of American troops into Mexico to pursue Villa. An editorial comment in the
American Journal

!!. International

~

vindioates Wilson's position.

In this

instanoe, the ·sohoolmaster" in Wilson appears more prominently than the
idealist.

The article states that there was no doubt that steps should have

been taken (as they were) to obtain reparation for the insult to our American sovereignty.

It further explains that under ordinary circumstances the

problem would have been put betore the Mexican Government with a request
that reparations be made and the bandits be apprehended and punished.

Seem-

ingly, sending troops across the trontier into Mexico constituted a violation of Mexican sovereignt,y just as the invasion of American soil constituted a violation of American sovereignty.

But, the article continues,

-------------- ...
8

i'
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8

"MeXiCO", American Jour. Internat'l. Law, 1913, Vol. 7, 836.
ial comment.
-

An editor-
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the situation in Mexico 'Was extraordinary, end even though Carranza t s government obtained
of Mexico.

~

facto recognition, Carranza still 'Was not in control ot all

At any rate, due to the fact that Carranza had been recognized,

he should have been called upon as the head of the
disavow the outrage.

~

facto government to

Upon his inability to accomplish this purpose, the

United States could decide for itself to capture Villa and his satellite.
Mexico and the United States have dealt 'With this border problem for many
years.

As far baok as 1855, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy in re-

gard to the border problem arbitrarily stated that if Mexican indians are
permitted to cross the border and harass the country, they may be chased
back over the border and punished.

In like manner, the Mexicans could enter

the United States to punish indians under the jurisdiction of the United
States who oross the Mexican border provided they abstain from punishing the
9
persons and property of the United States citizens. Wilson was willing to
maintain the same policy to 'Whioh the State Depar'bnent had been previously
commi tted.

Our Secretary of State Lansing oommunicated the follOWing under

Wilson's instructions
The Secretary of State to
Special Agent Silliman
Department of State
Washington, March 13, 1916
••• The Government ot the United States •••
readily grants permission for military
forces of the de faoto Government of

..-------_ .. _--.9 nThe American Punitive Expedition Into Mexico,· The Am. Jour. ot Internat'l Law, 1916, Vol. 10, 337-339. .An editoriaic;-omi1lent-,;y-James Brown
Scott.-
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Mexico to cross the international boundary in pursuit of lawless bands of armed
men who have entered Mexico from the
United States, committed outrages on
Mexican 80il. and fled into the United
States, on the understanding that the
de facto Government of Mexico grants
the reciprocal privilege that the military foroes of the United States may
pursue across the international boundary into Mexican territory lawless bands
of armed men who have entered the United
States from Mexico oommitted outrages on
American soil, and fled into Mexioo. lO
Lansing
As it turned out, Carranza opposed our entry into Mexico and aotua1ly
helped prevent the capture of Villa. ll

The entry of our troops into Mexico

was resented by the Mexicans, the very people whom Wilson thought he was
helping.

At ¥arral, it was believed that American troops were on the verge

of capturing Villa but they were attacked by the inhabitants of ¥arra1, so
they withdrew in order to prevent bloodshed.

Carranza denied the existenoe

of the agreement that he made with the United States under which this country believed it had the right to send forces into Mexico.

In faot no suoh

agreement existed, as far as his new government was concerned.

He said

that we entered Mexico without his consent and ordered the Amerioan troops
to withdraw.

In acoordance with the recommendations of the commission

established to adjust this matter, Wilson withdrew the American troops and
held the

~

faoto government responsible for Amerioan interests in the

affected territory of Mexico.

Thus closed the period of interrupted official

-------p------10
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11 See Chapter II of this paper, 28
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intercourse between the United States and Mexico which started with the
refusal of Wilson to recognize Huerta. Many hold that it would have been
wise tor Wilson not to have been so idealistically concerned about Mexico,
and therefore, to have recognized Huerta.

These same believed that Huerta

would have brought peace to Mexico and this would have saved years ot bloodshed and the United States some expenditure ot money.

They also say that

the tailure to recognize Huerta and the demands made upon him amounted to
intervention on the part ot the United States.
his article

~exico

However, George A. Finch in

and the United States," stands behind the president and

says there is no basis tor the assumption that Wilson's action toward Mexico
amounted to intervention.

The American policy tollowed the best practices

ot American traditions. 12 But it was obviously not Wilson's ideal policy
of trust in the people •

..__ .. ----------12 George A. Finch, "Mexioo and the United States," The American Journal
ot International Law, 1917, Vol. 11, 399-406.

-
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CHAPTER V
VARIOUS OPINIONS BY AMERICAN STATESMEN AND SCHOLARS
Amerioan statesmen and scholars of the United States foreign relations
have presented various general estimates of Wilson's policy toward Mexico.
Among the views of the statesmen there is the statement of Senator Culberson
printed in the Dallas Morning News, on May 3, 1914, whioh was the result of
an interview with the senator on the Mexican situation.

This information

was incorporated in the Congressional Record on May 16, 1914.

The senator

advooated the people to support Wilson's Mexioan policy beoause it "refleots
the best sentiment of the Amerioan people."
war.

The president wants to avoid

Aside from the sad results of a war, it would "dishonor us as a

ohristian nation for engaging in a useless and preventable confliot with a
comparatively helpless people."

The president's plan of giving the people

of Mexico an opportunity to settle their ovm problems, to refuse to intervene,
and to decline recognition of HUerta was a wise plan to follow.

Of the Tam-

pico inoident, the senator states that it was an aot which could be settled
short of war, but when suitable reparation was not made the president was.
"warranted in redressing by reprisals and seizure of ports."

The prinoiple

oomplaint was, however, that Huerta should have been reoognized.
it was believed that peace would have resulted.
that would have been extremely doubtful.
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To many,

But Senator Culberson states

He oonoludes, that we had a

64

president who went to the root of things and "declared the wholesome and
goodly doctrine that treachery and assassination would find no refuge here. nl
At Senator Howard's request, a letter whioh he received from Mr. George
Robinson Haokley, resident of Mexioo City for many years, was incorporated
into the Reoord because the senator believed it would show the truth of the
Mexioan situation to the Amerioan people.

The letter was dated August 28,

1913, and incorporated into the Record June 22, 1914:
••• 1 thank God that our president had the
prinoiple and moral oourage to refuse, in
spite of the insistent olamor of big business
interests, many being unscrupulous mercenaries, to help foist this false government
upon an unwilling and resisting people -did not help to prolong artificial conditions
brought about by one of the most diabolical
and revolting crimes in history, but is, on
the contrary, lending his moral support to
the oause of the people who are irresistibly
struggling for liberty. There are thousands
of intelligent Mexioans who respect and admire
the attitude of nonrecognition and the high
moral ground maintained ••• tt •
1 am certainly proud and delighted that
Washington has refused to reoognize or put
its approval on the assassins who have
usurped the Mexican Government, who, instead of representing the will of the
people, represent a betrayal of the will of
the people as expressed in the triumph of
the Madero revolution and his election to
the presidency ••• "
The oonstitutionalists stand on a
firmer and higher ground than Huerta, as they
are fighting against usurpation and for

--------------1
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liberty and constitutional government, and
should, in my opinion, receive from our
country and Government every sympathy,
encouragement, and assistance consistent
with our honor. How can we honorably
recognize, affiliate with, or assist on
illegal, unconstitutional Government,
established by "irregular foroe" and
violenoe, causing the deaths in the very
beginning, through on infamous fake battle
when Mexico City was 11 shot up," of thousands of innocent people, including women
and ohildren, even babies? To me it is
unthinkable."2

,

I'i

I

Harper's Weekly printed an article, August 22, 1914, by Charles W.
Eliot oalled

11

Wilson's Foreign Policies."

This was inoluded in the Reoord

by Honorable J. Thomas Heflin, represenative from .Alabama.

Mr. Eliot here

stated that the prinoiple aohievement of the Democratic party was a sound
international policy and conduct.

Wilson was thoroughly oommitted to no

forceful intervention. American investors went into Mexico of their own
free will beoause they thought they could make more money there than at
home.

Revolution in Mexioo would mean great loss to these industrious

Americans, this oould have been prevented by intervention.
to intervene.
Mexico.

Wilson refused

Instead he brought the Amerioans, who would leave, out of

With this policy, America made a great contribution to international

peaee. 3
The Jaoksonville (Ill.) Courier carried an artiole by former Congressman James M. Graham of Springfield entitled, "Graham Defends Wilson's Mexican

2 Congo Ree., 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 1914, Vol. 51, App. 666-668.
3
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Polioy -- Blames Capitalists For Disturbances In Talk At Franklin Catholic
Picnic."

It was incorporated into the Reoord September 7, 1916.

defends Wilson's policy.

Mr. Graham

He said border and international problems that

have made our relations with Mexico strained for so many years was the fault
of Amerioan oapitalists who wanted the United States to control Mexioo so
that their property in Mexioo would inorease in value.

Amerioans owned more
/

than forty per cent of land and this had deoreased in value sinoe Diaz's

r~gime had oollapsed.

He praised the president's resistanoe against the

power of these wealthy groups of oapitalists.
I

Then Mr. Graham reviews the

,

Diaz regime when oapitalists were allowed to enter the oountry with their
views of exploitation.

He says that these influenoes are so powerful they

own a large part of the wealth of Mexioo as well as a large part of wealth
in the United States.

Consequently, they oontrol the press and thus oan

exert a power in forming publio opinion.

By this method they wish the

authorities in the United States to oonform to their views.

They want our

government to intervene in Mexioo to protect their property there.
italist does not care about the rights of man.

The cap-

People of this type put a

higher value on property rights than rights of man.

Mr. Graham states that

Senator La Follette expressed the view that Amerioan finanoiers have been

!I,I,
I"
:1'
'I"

responsible for Amerioan raids on the frontier to awaken the Amerioan public
who in turn would force Wilson to intervene.

In oonclusion, Mr. Graham said,

"I doubt if the people will ever fully realize the magnificent resistanoe
whioh President Wilson has made to the efforts put forth by these powerful
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combinations of wealth ••• 11 4
The referenoe to La Follette in the previous paragraph introduces an
artiole in Senator La Follette's magazine written by him entitled "Who Owns
Mexico'l"

This artiole was incorporated into the Record at the request of

Honorable Pat Harrison of Mississippi on August 11, 1916.

Prooeeding from

where Mr. Graham left off, La Follette denounoes the ambitions of big monied
interests.

Those who want war with Mexico are those that also own most of

the United States.

They are the oaptains of industry and finance.

Their

profits are so great they want to lower interest rates or else invest in
foreign countries.
labor is cheap.

They invest in the oountries of Latin Amerioa where

But there is one drawbaok, the governments in most of them

are weak, therefore, revolutions are frequent and property rights unstable.
But they can make their foreign investments good by inlisting the baoking of
the United States.

They wanted intervention and they tried to influence

publio opinion in that direction.

Intervention meant war.

Concluding,

La Follette said, "In the ovmership of Mexico we find that real menaoe to
the peace between Mexioo and the United States.

American oapitalists are

desperately attempting to have the flag follow their investments. 1I5
Honorable Claudius A. Stone of Illinois on September 5, 1916, spoke
before the House of Representatives at which time he gave his opinion of
Wilson's Mexioan Po1iey.

The representative begins, ttpresident Wilson's

4
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faith in demooraoy and the unselfishness of the United States in internationaJ. dealings have beon so strikingly expressed in his Mexioan polioy that

II
"

it may be said to oonstitute the greatest contribution which the country has
made in many years to the progressive thought of mankind."

The president

stayed with his Mexioan polioy throughout his administration for two reasons;
first, his belief that all nations, weak or strong have the inviolable right
to control their internal problems and secondly, his belief that Mexioo will
not become peaoeful and law abiding until she has been left to settle her

own problems without interference

fr~

elsewhere.

Our relations with Mexioo

were closely connected with the rest of Latin Amerioa.

Before Wilson's

Administration, Latin America was suspioious of the United States.

The Mexi-

oan policy to our neighbors presented a test of our sinoerity and friendship.
They believe they could expect no better treatment than the United States
would extend to Mexico.

Consequently, besides handling the Mexioan situation

Wilson was concerned with formulating a cooperative pollcy for Pan-Amerioa.
It was created not only for trade relations but also for the development of
an international brotherhood. Wilson's Mexican policy did accomplish this.
Latin America became more trusting of the United States.

Honorable Stone

states that" in strengthening the bonds of good-will between the Republics
of this hemisphere Mr. Wilson has rendered a patriotic service of highest
order."

When Wilson was faced with the problem of recognition of Huerta,

some of his advisers only considered the selfish interests involved, they
wanted to sacrifice Mexioan liberties to establish order under any circumstance and thereby proteot Amerioan property.

But fortunately Wilson did
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not weaken for it was later believed that Huerta was not powerful enough to
oontrol Mexico.

Carranza was recognized by the Latin American oountries and

the United States because it seemed to them that his forces oontained more
organization, unity and harmony thus showing the brighter promise for Mexico's salvation.

After reoognition, Carranza's oampaign against Villa was

more sucoessful.

Villa foroes disintegrated into small bands and he himself

degenerated into only a bandit leader.
Amerioan intervention.

He raided the border to bring about

Intervention did not result but the situation showed

the United States that they could not depend on Carranza for help against
Villa.

As a result, Wilson ordered Pershing to capture Villa.

Wilson

informed the Mexicans that the Amerioan expedition into Mexico was solely
for the purpose of punishing those responsible for the Columbus raid.
Because of the Columbus raid and a little later the Carrizal affair, pressure
was brought to bear upon the president to deolare war.

This would have been

a war by a well-armed, great nation against a bankrupt people, tired with
five years of civil strife.
little nations of the world.

Wilson acted his theory of not exploiting the
The president was also concerned about affairs

in Europe and a better development for Pan-Amerioan understanding.
refused to go to war with Mexico.

He

Wilson's policy paved the way for settle-

ment of disputes by a joint commission ornnposed of three Americans and three
Mexicans.

Conoluding, "Thus, the story of the

as it began, a

sto~J

of peace -- peace.

Wilson~exican

policy closes

War if neoessary, but not for mere

misunderstandings; not for lack of patience and oertainly not for

I

IIii

ill
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eXPloitation."S
J. Hamilton Lewis, Senator from Illinois, in his remarks in the Senate,
January lS, 1915, justified Wilson's recognition of Carranza.

'!

He said,

Carranza was chosen for recognition because he showed more strength and a
more advantageous position in Mexioo than the other partisan leaders.

It

was not done merely at the Itoaprice" of the president, without information
of justification upon the conditions.

Then he conoludes:

•••Will not my eminent opponents be
just to history and infornl the United
States of America fairly that it was
only after consultation with the large
and princiPal oountries of South America
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile -- neighbors
of Mexioo, bound by the same ties, held
by the same sacred religion, animated by
the same motives, and inspired by the
same aspirations, knowing as they must
have known better than all other souroes
what was best for their neighbors and
their blood kin-that it was from these
that there oame the suggestion, as well
as the proof, that Carranza was at the
time the most promising solution of the
then disturbing problem and that upon
their request and manifestation of facts
the recognition was acoorded? Then it
was that Carranza was recognized."7
Among the various general estimates of the Amerioan soho1ars of the
United States foreign relations concerning Wilson's policy toward Carranza,
there is the views of Latan~ and Wainhouse.

In their diplomatio history,
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they indioate that the "handling of the Mexican situation, though denounoed
at the time as weak and vacillating, was in full aooord with his new LatinAmerican policy."

They say that it was quite clearly a violation of our

ancient policy to refuse recognition to Huerta, but they argue that Huerta
could not olaim the backing of the majority of the Mexioan people.
was "a self-constituted dictator.tt
recognizing him.

Huerta

Therefore, Wilson was justified in not

He was justified in reoognizing Carranza beoause the latter

had the baoking of "three-fourths of the territory of Mexioo."

In the first

instanoe there is question of the majority of people and in the second there
is question of a majority
tion of popular eleotions.

of~.

In neither instance is there any ques-

Certainly, if the popular will of the people of

the United States were to be followed, Wilson wuuld have to have gone to
war against Mexioo, in view of the "loud and persistent demanl in the United
States for war against Mexioo," after the reoognition of Carranza.

Wilson's

idealism overlooked the faot that scarcely ever in the history of the Latin
American republics had the will of the people been oonsidered, and he was
soon to learn that Carranza was not oonoerned about the will of the majority.
In suomary, Latan' and Wainhouse point to the great moral effeot of Wilson's
polioy of staying out of a war against Carranza. 8
President Wilson's refusal to beoome
involved in war with Mexioo oonvinced the
world of his sinoerity and gave him a
hearing during the Great War suoh as no

8 John H. Latan~ and David W. Wainhouse, A History ~ Amerioan Foreie
Polio~, The Odyssey Press, New York, 1940, 556-660.
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political leader of any nation ever before
oommanded. His acoeptanoe of the mediation
of the ABC Powers and his subsequent oonsultation with the leading representatives of
Latin Amerioa @ave new life and meaning to
Pan Amerioanism and tended to refute the
oharges of the Pan Hispanists. 9
It is very doubtful, if we judge by subsequent events, whether Mexico appreciated this sentiment of respeot for Wilson's sinoerity.
That President Wilson had pioked the wrong man in Carranza is clear
from the account of our relations with Mexico as given by Professor Bemis.
We find such damaging statements as these:
The Government of Mexico fell among
rival armed factions, temporarily to the
Carranzistas who at all times denied the
right of foreign powers to mediate in any
settlement of Mexioan affairs.
The elimination of Huerta did not
bring peace to Mexico ••••
Confusion worse confounded, murder
and pillage, swept Mexico. Anxious to
hasten the establishment of order, President Wilson summoned a conference of
diplomatic representatives of six LatinAmerioan powers ••• to advise on which
warring faction to recognize and support
as the de facto government of Mexico.
The-oonference invited representatives
of the Mexican groups to participate.
Despite the fact that Carranza refused the
invitation and consistently denied the
right of outside parties to give advice
to Mexico, the oonferees announced their
decision that the Carranzista party was
'the only party possessing the essentials
of recognition •••• ' The United States
then promptly (October 19, 1915) recognized de facto Carranza's authority ••••

9

~.,

660.

73
The de facto recognition of Carranza
proved premature. lO
The instances of our troops activities along the borders under General
Pershing and the utter inability of Mexican troops to prevent raids, along
with Carranza's resentment over our troops and interference are then
reoounted.

Then we find that the Mexican Congress, not the Mexican people,

elected Carranza president.
Wilson now hastily recognized the new
government de jure. When Henry p. Fletcher,
the new Ambassador of the United States,
entered the Chamber of Deputies, the members
received him with hisses, in s~eful contrast to the applause which greeted the
German Ambassador, whose proposal to Mexico
the British secret service and Washington
government had just ventilated to the world:
a war alliance, to inolude Japan, for the
purpose of conquering back from the United
States 'the lost territory' in the states
of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona ••• It was
a spectacular victory for Carranza •••• ll
The watohful waiting policy if we are to judge by the statistics which
Professor Bemis presents may have had some ideal behind it, but a casual
observer would be bound to admit that it had no eye to the protection of
Amerioans and their interest, since 397 American citizens were killed in
Mexico and forty to fifty thousand forced to leave with American property
losses between 170 million and 505 million pesos, according to different
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Frederick Starr of the University of Chioago, who spent four years in
Mexico during these troublesome times, wrote his opinions of the situation
to

the year 1914.

He writes:
The latest step in the battle between
the two presidents has been the lifting of
the embargo upon arms •••• It is amusing,
however, and saddening. to find ourselves
baoking Villa and Carranza at the present.
The avowed reason for hostility to Huerta
is his bloody hands. His are olean, oompared with Villa's.
What is the status at the present time?
We have impaired a nation's sovereignty, -a serious matter; we have prolonged a bloody
oonf1iot, with hideous cruelties and frightful
loss; we have entrenched a man in power, whose
natural elimination was desireable and would
soon have come about; we have produoed ruin
and disaster by a hysterical cry of exodus;
we have made it impossible legally to 001leot damages by refusing to reoognize a
de faoto government; we are encouraging and
abetting flagrant abuse of individual rights
and property.
All this we have done, and still are
doing, with the best intentions in the
world. 13

i

Professor Rippy points out that "Wilson took up the Mexioan problem
with the vision of a Pan Amerioan and even a world reformer."

His policy

ttwas olearly one of intervention, moral but far-reaching in its consequences.t'

Rippy then describes how the Latin-Amerioan states accepted Wilson's

leadership, but all of the European nations and Japan recognized Huerta.
Wilson then brought pressure to bear upon the Europeans, who finally sent a
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delegation to Huerta in
port to

h~.

Deoember~

19l3~

to say that they would lend no sup-

Wilson thus blooked off all possibilities of aid or a loan to

[
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II
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Huerta.

It was all for the good of the Mexioan

people~

Wilson said. Rippy

does not give the obvious oonolusion that this was all a policy of the end
"t"f"
~ ~es the means. 14
JUs
Rippy appears to be

anti-imperialist~

and henoe his attaok is on the

intervention of the United States in the affairs of any nation.
reoognition of Carranza a seoond intervention in Mexioan

affairs~

He oalls the
and sug-

gests the inoonsistenoy of following the policy of non-intervention along
diplomatic lines and intervention by military means.

He oites the attaoks

of the Republioan Senators Albert Fall and Willian E. Borah upon the watohful waiting polioy and he follows with the opinions of the Representatives
who made an issue of it.

Carranza and Villa oontinued their attitude of

hate toward the United States

until~

the writer states,

The whole country burst into flame and
even Wilson himself either lost patienoe
or feared to remain inaotive. Release of the
captured troops was demanded in none too diplomatic terms. For a moment Carranza refused to
comply. The peace of the two oountries was
suspended by a thread. The entire militia of
the United States was ordered to the border
and available men for the Governor-Generalship
of Mexioo were disoussed. But just before the
breaking point was reaohed ••• Samuel Gompers
sent a personal telegram to Carranza~ ~ploring
h~ in the name of humanity to release the
Amerioan prisoners. A few hours later extras
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announced to the Amerioan PUblio that the
soldiers in question had been set free.15
1f.Qy it was that Wilson later recognized Carranza after this and after the

events of the years following is still not olear, and Ripp'y admits that he
oannot pass final judgment upon Wilson's polioy.

"So far as improvement in

Mexioan attitude toward the United States was ooncerned, little had been
acoomplished ."16
Professor Bailey in his Chapter XXXVI, "Wilson and the New Diplomacy,
1913-1917," uses practioa11y the same souroes as those already cited, but
adds something to the interpretation of Wilson's Mexioan policy.

"In all

diplomatio problems of major importance Wilson acted as his own Secretary of
State."

Latin America seemed the most urgent of the problems, and a week

after his inauguration Wilson stated his policy in regard to the southern
republios.

"He struok out Dollar Diplomaoy by announoing that the Adminis-

tration was not interested in supporting any' special group of interests'."
The people applauded, but very soon the dollar had to be revived as far as
the Caribbean was ooncerned.

"President Wilson, like another distinguished

idealist, Thomas Jefferson, found it diffioult to square his theories with
stern realities.
Caribbean. 1I

This was partioularly true of Central Amerioa and the

Yet, a year later he won the applause of the British and the

world for his honest stand in the matter of the Panama Tolls. 17
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Then Bailey discusses Wilson's Mexican policy.

This he heads "Human

Rights and Property Rights," and summarizes it as "a sharp clash between
idealiam and legalism."

According to Bailey, Wilson stated:· "I am going

to teach the South American Republics to elect good

men~"

Wilson was not

going to follow the lines of least resistance and recognize Huerta.

The

vast amount of criticism of this interference program is summarized by
George Harvey, who demanded:

"What legal or moral right has a President of

the United States to say who shall or shall not be President of Mexico."
Wilson

11

suspected that the British oil interests were backing the 'unspeak-

able Huerta' •••• and therefore pursued a policy of nonrecognition and noninterference (which, under the circumstances, was really interference)."
Then under the heading of "Wrathful Waiting," Bailey gives an account of the
savage criticism heaped upon Wilson at home and abroad.

The waiting ended,

and Wilson had no other course apparently but to embark on a war.

According

to Bailey it would seem that the mediation of the ABC powers, unthought
of by Wilson, really saved the situation. 18
Bailey does not add anything to the already given accounts of the recognition of Carranza.

He summarizes the situation in 1917 after

recognition as follows:
•••Wilson withdrew the troops in February,
1917. They left behind a snarling Carranza,
a defiant and unrepentant Villa, and a

18
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revolution that had yet to run its course.
Whatever mAy be said of Wilson's policy
it is olear that he adhered consistently to
the ideal of encouraging the Mexioan masses
to work out their own destiny.19
With the entrance of the United States in the first World War, the
crises of the Mexioan situation receded into the background and remained
there for two years. Wilson's attentions shifted to the European situation.
On June 8,. 1918, he made his pronouncement to Congress of his famous Fourteen
Points.

The final German offensive in the west failed, July, 1918.

This

was immediately followed by a series of long-distance exchanges of peace

views made by different governments.

On Ootober 6, 1918, Germany requested

an armistice whioh was signed November 11, 1918, between the Allied and
Associate Powers and Germany with

t~e

Fourteen Points as an agreed peaoe

bases. Wilson's primary interest, at this time, was to incorporate the
League of Nations in the peace treaties to be signed with the various countries.
tion.

Hls determination took him to Paris as head of the Amerioan del egaBemis oomments "He arrived in Europe as a true friend of mankind,

closer to the principles of Christian oharity and justice than any statesman
in history."

Nilson made the mistake of not including in the American Peace

Commission representative from both parties in the Senate who would be responsible for ratifying the treaties.

The Paris Peace Conference opened

January 12, 1919. When Wilson returned from Paris he was criticized bitterly
for not discussing the text of the League of Nations directly with the Senate
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to secure their opinions.

But~

in its

stead~

he discussed the document in

public addresses and then informally with the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate together with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House.
He also began a speaking tour of the country to rally the public to his support.

But on September 26, 1919, extremely overworked, he collapsed

was never able to recover his health.
its most eloquent champion. 1t

As Bemis states, "The oause had lost

Wilson never was able to resume governmental

duties and for months the country was without an executive head.
the senate refused to ratify the League of Nations.

Bemis~!

Diplomatio Histo£l of

~

}~anwhile,

On February 3, 1924,

"Wilson died broken and bitterly disappointed.,,20

20
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United States, 624-655.
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